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Protected Petitioning or Unlawful
Retaliation? The Limits of First
Amendment Immunity for
Lawsuits Under the
Fair Housing Act
David K. Godschalk'

I. INTRODUCTION

Free speech and equal protection are at the core of American notions about
rights and justice. In the context of fair housing, however, the two ideals have
come into conflict as courts and federal agencies have addressed attempts to use
lawsuits, ordinarily protected by the First Amendment right to petition the
government for redress of grievances, to deny equal housing opportunities to
protected groups.'
The Fair Housing Act (the "Act") prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental
of housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin,

*. The author is an associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Hawkins, Delafield & Wood.
This article was written as a research and writing project at Harvard University's Kennedy School of
Government, under the supervision of the late Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Public Service
Professor of Jurisprudence and Chief Judge Emeritus, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
without whose kind support it would not have been completed. The author also wishes to thank
Frederick Schauer, Academic Dean and Stanton Professor of the First Amendment at the Kennedy
School, and Jonathan Strong, formerly Deputy Assistant General Counsel for Fair Housing
Enforcement at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, for their many thoughtful
comments and suggestions.
I. See White v. Julian, No. C 95-1757 MHP, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21899 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5,
1996) (lawsuit alleging HUD investigation of opposition to group home violated First Amendment);
United States v. Wagner, 940 F. Supp. 972, 978-80 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (state court lawsuit to block sale
of house for use as a group home violated 42 U.S.C. § 3617); United States v. Scott, 788 F. Supp. 1555.
1561-62 (D. Kan. 1992) (state court lawsuit to enforce restrictive covenant prohibiting group homes
violated 42 U.S.C. § 3617). This conflict has been most apparent in the fair housing context in lawsuits
involving the siting of group homes in residential neighborhoods. But (f HUD v. Grappone, P-H: Fair
Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. para. 25,059, at p. 25,573-79 (HUD AL 1993); HUD v. Tucker, P-H: Fair
Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. para. 25,033, at p.25,348-49 (HUD AL 1992). See Part IV, infra.

or handicap. 2 Under the Act, discrimination can take various forms, such as the
failure to sell or rent property, steering persons to particular neighborhoods, the use
of different terms of sale or rental, or harassment and intimidation of individuals
in the exercise of their fair housing rights.'
The classic means of intimidation are familiar: arson, firebombing, assault,
crossburnings, and vandalism.' The Act's prohibitions on intimidation and
interference are not limited to violent acts, however it also bans nonviolent
retaliation, including some commercial and legal actions.' Cases upholding the ban
on discriminatory legal actions have frequently involved attempts to use zoning or
restrictive covenants to prevent the operation of group homes.6 Victims of such
tactics have used the Act to challenge those who have attempted to use lawsuits
against them.

2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1998), originally enacted as Title Vill of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
amended bv the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808, 88
Stat. 633, 729 (1974) (adding discrimination based on sex), and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988). The Fair Housing Amendments Act prohibits
discrimination based on "handicap." See §§ 3602(h), 3604, 3605, 3606. In accordance with current
usage, the text of this paper refers to discrimination based on "disability," although the statute's
language, where directly quoted, is left in its original form.
3. See42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-06, 3617.
4. See. e.g., United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 1994) (crossburning); United States v.
Wood, 780 F.2d 955 (I Ith Cir. 1986) (physical assault motivated by association of victims with persons
of other races); United States v. White, 788 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1986) (arson of home being constructed
by black family in white neighborhood); Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 F.2d 208 (N.D. III. 1985) (black
complainant's car vandalized and burned after he moved to white suburb); Stirgus v. Benoit, 720 F.
Supp. 119 (N.D. III. 1989) (racially-motivated firebombing). For an extensive collection of cases in
which such violent harassment has been found to violate the criminal provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 3631
of the Fair Housing Act, see ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION
20.4 n.15 (1997).
5. See, e.g., Michigan Protection & Advocacy Serv. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1994)
(noting that physical force or violence are not necessary elements in establishing a violation of § 3617).
6. See, e.g. Skipper v. Hambleton Meadows Architectural Review Committee, 996 F. Supp. 478
(D. Md. 1998); Hill v. Community of Damien of Molokai, 911 P.2d 861, 871-76 (N.M. 1996) (holding
that a group home's actions did not violate restrictive covenant under state law, and enforcing covenant
would violate the Act); United States v. Wagner, 940 F. Supp. 972,979,(N.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that
a lawsuit to enforce single family deed restrictions against group home violated § 3617 of the Act);
Martin v. Constance, 843 F. Supp. 1321, 1325 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (holding that enforcement of restrictive
covenant to oppose group home violated the Act); Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, N.J.,
799 F. Supp. 450,461 (D. N.J. 1992) (finding a prima facie case of disparate impact where Township's
interpretation of zoning ordinance served to exclude group homes); United States v. Scott, 788 F. Supp.
1555, 1562 (D. Kan. 1992) (holding that defendants violated the Act by "attempting to enforce a
restrictive covenant to prevent handicapped individuals from residing in their neighborhood," where
state court had previously held that plaintiffs had not violated the restrictive covenants); United States
v. Borough of Audubon, N.J., 797 F. Supp. 353, 357 (D.N.J. 1991), off'd mem., 968 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.
1992). Similar cases have involved attempts to use zoning rules to discriminate on the basis of race.
See United States v. City of Parma, Ohio, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1099 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (finding FHA
violation based upon race, explaining that "laIctions which are typically lawful, such as a mandatory
referendum on housing and zoning matters ....
lose that character when they are undertaken for a
discriminatory purpose.").
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On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that lawsuits can fall within the
protection of the First Amendment's "right to petition" clause,7 but the limits of the
immunity which attends such petitioning are unclear and vary dramatically in
different circumstances. In some fields, such as antitrust law, the limits are clearer
having developed over decades of litigation. In others, like fair housing, they are
still evolving.
Consider a recent case. The owner of a house in a small subdivision wishes
to sell and locates a buyer. The two parties arrange the sale of the house. Before
the sale closes, word reaches the neighbors that the buyer intends to convert the
house into a group home for autistic children. They hastily circulate a petition
opposing the group home and file suit against the seller claiming that the proposed
use violates the restrictive covenants that preserve the single family character of
their subdivision. The seller responds by filing a complaint under sections 804 and
817 of the Act charging that the neighbors' lawsuit is an attempt to deny housing
to people with disabilities. The neighbors defend their suit as an exercise of their
First Amendment right to petition the courts for a redress of grievances." How is
the court to rule?8
This pattern has arisen in jurisdictions across the country, making efforts to
enforce local zoning rules or private covenants against group homes an important
forum for emerging case law regarding the role of lawsuits under the Act. In
deciding such cases, courts have been charting new territory searching for guidance
on the right to petition in antitrust and labor law, and attempting to balance the
relevant state and federal interests.
This interplay between the right to petition and the Act was a matter of interest
mostly to practitioners, until a much publicized 1994 investigation by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") in Berkeley, California
brought it to the attention of the larger public. That incident is important because
it set the stage for current attempts by Congress and the executive branch to resolve
this seeming conflict between the Act and the First Amendment.
In the summer of 1994, HUD began an investigation of a complaint under the
Act alleging discriminatory community opposition to a shelter for people with
disabilities. One issue in the investigation involved a neighborhood group that had
filed suit in state court against the proposed shelter seeking to overturn the shelter's

7. U.S. CONST. amend. 1: "'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
8. This hypothetical is loosely based upon the facts in United States i'. Wagner, 940 F. Supp. 972
(N.D. Tex. 1996), discussed in Part IV, infra. Similar scenarios can be found in cases such as Skipper
v.Hamilton Meadow, 996 F. Supp. 478 (D. Md. 1988), and United States v. Robinson, Civ. No.
3:92CV0345 (D. Conn. 1995).

zoning variance. 9 In response, the agency planning to operate the shelter filed a
complaint with HUD alleging that the plaintiffs had violated the Act by pursuing
the state court action and impeding construction of the shelter, thereby impairing
the agency's ability to provide housing for people with disabilities. ° The
complaint alleged that the plaintiffs opposed the shelter because the shelter's
residents would include people with mental and physical disabilities, including
recovering alcoholics and drug addicts."
In response to HUD's investigation, the plaintiffs filed suit against HUD
claiming that the agency had violated their First Amendment rights by, among other
things, demanding membership lists and offering to drop federal charges if the
group would drop its lawsuit against
the shelter. HUD was denounced for
2
trampling on the First Amendment.
The outcry resulting from the Berkeley incident spawned a number of
governmental attempts to reconcile federal fair housing law and the right to
petition. HUD moved rapidly to issue new guidance regarding its policy on cases
involving the First Amendment.' 3 Public concern over the Berkeley case also
generated congressional attempts to provide standards limiting the government's
authority to initiate enforcement action or investigations in cases involving political
speech or judicial petitioning.' 4
The solution ultimately adopted by the courts or Congress will have a powerful
impact on the future of both fair housing, land use, and zoning law. Overprotection

9. See White v. Julian, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21899, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 1996).
10. See id. (quoting the language of the complaint).
II. Alcoholism and substance addiction are considered disabilities within the meaning of the Fair
Housing Act. See Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1182 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
12. See, e.g., Sigfredo A. Cabrera, HUD Continues Its Assault on Free Speech, WALL ST. J.,June
7,1995, at AI5; HUD's Thought Police, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1994, at A12; Henr, Cisneros' War
on the Constitution, WASH. TiMES,Aug. 16, 1994, at A 16;
Joyce Price, Progress 'Aggressive' at HUD:
New policies, programs Hit for 'Big Brother' Pushiness, WASH. TIMES, Sep. 27, 1994, at A8.
13. As a result of the Berkeley incident, Roberta Achtenberg, Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing
and Equal Opportunity at the time of the investigation, issued new guidelines setting forth the
circumstances under which investigations may be limited by First Amendment concerns. Those
guidelines provide that the filing or prosecution of "frivolous" lawsuits may violate the Fair Housing
Act. See Roberta Achtenberg, Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, Notice to
FHEO Office Directors, Substantive citd Procedural Linitations'on Filing and hivestigating Fair
Housing Act Complaints That May Implicate the First Amendent,at 5 (hereinafter FHEO Notice) (on
file with author); see also Robert S. Swierczek. Achtenberg Issues Enforcement Guidelinesfor Fair
Housing Cases Involving First Amendment, 22 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 257 (Sep. 12, 1994).
Achtenberg's memorandum expressly stated that the new guidelines were intended to provide
"maximum deference" for First Amendment speech protections in situations where there is interplay
between those protections and the Fair Housing Act. See FHEO Notice, at 1.
As the agency with primary responsibility for implementing and administering the Fair Housing
Act, HUD's interpretations of the statute are "'entitled to great weight," Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
his. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972). so long as they do not violate the statute's plain meaning and are
reasonable constructions of the law. See generally Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
14. See Part IV, in-fra.
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of lawsuits could create new barriers to housing opportunity; underprotection of
those lawsuits could chill lawful petitioning activity and feed a perception that the
government is out of touch with the legitimate concerns of its citizens. The
solution adopted is also likely to have implications the interpretation of the First
Amendment in other circumstances under the Act, such as in cases involving
attempts to persuade political decisionmakers to take discriminatory action.
The goal of this article is to explore the sources and interpretations of
petitioning immunity for lawsuits, and to suggest how the right to petition may be
construed in the fair housing context to provide the proper deference to the First
Amendment and to preserve the goals of the Act. This article addresses the two
main competing standards that have been proposed for determining when a lawsuit
violates the Act. The first, adopted by HUD, the Department of Justice, and a
number of federal district courts, is the Supreme Court's ruling in Bill Johnson's
Restaurants,Inc. v. NLRB ("Bill Johnson's").5 The second, proposed in Congress
in a series of bills, is drawn from Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
This article attempts to provide some comparison of the merits of these two
standards within the context of existing First Amendment jurisprudence. 6
Part I begins with a brief discussion of the relevant prohibitions on discrimination in the Act, its implementing regulations, and their interpretation by the courts.
Special attention is given to the accumulating body of law dealing with the legality
of local zoning rules and decisions which interfere with the siting and operation of
group homes for individuals with disabilities, because those cases have provided
a growing source of law regarding the status of lawsuits under the First Amendment. Part II traces the history of the right to petition and examines the interplay
between the right to petition, the common law, and statutory limits on lawsuits.
Part III examines the Supreme Court's decision in Bill Johnson'sand the two-part
test it sets forth, as well as the meaning and importance of the "illegal objective"
exception. Part IV addresses the current attempts to chart a First Amendment
policy for the Act by HUD, the courts, and Congress. Part V argues, in conclusion,
that the Bill Johnson's standard is more suitable for application to the Act than a
Rule 11 based approach. It further argues that the illegal objective rule is viable
for fair housing cases, and it discusses the possible application of Bill Johnson's
standard to cases involving suits enforcing discriminatory zoning rules or
restrictive covenants.

15.
16.

See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
For an excellent article addressing this same question, see generally David Franklin, Comment.

Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties? The Legality of State Court LUtwsuits under the Fair Housing Act, 63

U. CHI. L. REV. 1607 (1996). This article shares much of Mr. Franklin's analysis, but differs
significantly in several conclusions.

II. HISTORY AND GOALS OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
Congress originally enacted the Act in the wake of the Martin Luther King
assassination as Title VIII of the landmark 1968 Civil Rights Act. 7 The Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988 extended the original prohibitions on
discrimination to include gender and disability and to strengthen the enforcement
authority allocated to HUD and the Department of Justice. 8
In adopting the Act, Congress intended to preempt state and local laws that
conflict with its prohibitions. Section 815 of the Act states that "[a]ny law of a
State, a political subdivision, or other such jurisdiction that purports to require or
permit any action that would be a discriminatory housing practice under this
subchapter shall to that extent be invalid."'9
Currently, the Act prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing on

17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1994); See SCHWEMM, shupra note 4, at 5-4. Professor Schwemm
provides a comprehensive study of the Act's legislative history, constitutionality, and interpretations
of Congressional intent. See id. ch. 5 - 7, 5-1 - 7-12.
18. The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 created the current administrative enforcement
system, added two new protected classes (families with children and persons with disabilities),
expanded the ban on discrimination in residential financing, and amended the definition of
discriminatory housing practices to include interference and intimidation under § 3617. See SCI-WEMM,
supra note 4, at 5-6.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (1994) (emphasis added). The House Judiciary Committee stated expressly
that the Act was intended to apply to "state and local land use and health and safety laws, regulations,
practices or decisions which discriminate against individuals with handicaps," as well as to zoning
decisions and practices with the same effect. Report of the House Judiciary Committee, H.R. Rep. No.
100-711, at 24 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.S.C.A.N. 2173, 2185 [hereinafter House Report]. As the
House Judiciary Report accompanying the Fair Housing Amendments Act makes clear, the amendments
were specifically intended "to prohibit special restrictive covenants . . . which have the effect of
excluding ... congregate living arrangements for persons with handicaps." Id. at 2173, 2184. The
House Report further stated that the Act "prohibitls] the application of special requirements through
land use regulations, restrictive covenants, and conditional or special use permits that have the effect
of limiting the ability of [disabled personsl to live in the residence of their choice in the community."
Id.
This preemption of local zoning authority has been tested numerous times, and courts have
repeatedly held that local zoning rules and restrictive covenants that have the effect of prohibiting group
homes in single-family neighborhoods violate the Act. See United States v. Wagner, 940 F. Supp. 972,
979 (N.D. Tex. 1996). Cf Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court, 988 F.2d 252 (1st Cir. 1993). See also
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 514 U.S. 725, 734-35 (1995) (holding that local zoning rule
providing occupancy limits for unrelated persons in single-family homes was not an exempt occupancy
restriction under § 3607(b)( I ) of the Fair Housing Act). For an exhaustive summary of the extensive
case law involving zoning and group homes under the Fair Housing Act, see SCHWEMM, supranote 4,
at 11-48 - 11-79; see also Douglas E. Miller, Note, The FairHHotsing Act, O.ford House, and the Limits
of Local Control over the Regulation of Group Homes for Recovering Addicts, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1467 (1995) (discussing law and policy regarding location of group homes for substance abusers
in single-family neighborhoods).
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the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability.20
The main substantive provisions of the Act's prohibitions on discrimination in the
sale or rental of housing, the provision of loans or financing, or the provision of
appraisal or brokerage services-are found in sections 3604 through 3606.2
Section 818 provides further protection for persons exercising the rights
guaranteed by sections 803 through 806 of the Act.22 Specifically, section 818
makes it unlawful to "coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person.
. on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise
or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section... 3604 of this title."-

20. 42 U.S.C. § 3604. While the language of the Fair Housing Act speaks of discrimination "based
on" or "because of" a person's protected status, a showing of intent to discriminate based on protected
status is not always required to establish liability. See generallY SCHWEMM, supra note 4, 10.1- 10.4(5)
(discussing methods of proof involving intentional or direct discrimination, mixed motive, and
disparate impact). The following cases also illuminate this point: Mountain! Side Mobile Estates
Partnership v. HUD, 56 F.3d 1243, 1250(10th Cir. 1995) (analyzing disparate impact claim in familial
status discrimination case against private defendant); Bangerter v.Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491,
1501 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding a challenge to a city's conditional use permit by residents of group home
for mentally retarded was a disparate treatment, not a disparate impact claim); Jackson v.Okaloosa
Countv.,21 F.3d 1531 (11 th Cir. 1994) (following the Fifth Circuit's recognition of the disparate impact
analysis); Casa Marie, hic. v.Superior Ct. of Puerto Rico, 988 F.2d 252, 269 (1st Cir. 1993)
(recognizing elements of disparate impact claim under Title Vm); Edwards v. Johnson County Health
Dept., 885 F.2d 1215, 1223 (4th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that practices with disparate impact violate
the Fair Housing Act); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467,482-83 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying disparate impact
analysis in racial discrimination case against municipality); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of
Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937-39 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd per curiamn, 418 U.S. 15 (1988) (applying
disparate impact analysis in racial discrimination case against municipality); Arthur v. City of Toledo,
Ohio, 782 F.2d 565,576-77 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying disparate impact analysis in racial discrimination
case against city housing authority); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assoc., 736 F.2d 983, 986-89 (4th Cir.
1984) (applying disparate impact analysis in racial discrimination case against private defendant);
Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2d Cir. 1979) (applying disparate impact analysis
in racial discrimination case against private defendant); United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791
(5th Cir. 1978) (recognizing that practices with disparate impact violate the Fair Housing Act); Resident
Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3rd Cir. 1977) (applying disparate impact analysis in
racial discrimination case against city government); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying disparate impact analysis in racial
discrimination case against municipality); United States v.City of Black Jack. Mo., 508 F.2d 1179,
1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974) (applying disparate impact analysis in racial discrimination case against city
government); Williams v. Matthews Co.. 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir. 1974) (applying disparate impact
analysis in racial discrimination case against private defendant).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606.
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 3617. Section 803 of the Fair Housing Act provides for the scope of the Act's
coverage and certain exemptions. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603,
23. 42 U.S.C. § 3617. HUD's implementing regulations define the scope of this prohibition to
include:
Coercing a person, either orally, in writing, or by other means, to deny or limit the benefits
provided that person in connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling or in connection with

In the Preamble to its regulations implementing the Act, HUD observed that
"a broad range of activities" can constitute illegal intimidation or interference under
section 3617.24 It is not necessary to find a corresponding violation of one of the
other substantive provisions of the Act in order for a violation of section 3617 to
exist.-' Although physical violence or duress are frequent elements of claims
invoking section 3617, they are not necessary to establish a violation. 26 Courts
have applied section 3617 broadly to cover "all practices which have the effect of
interfering with the exercise of rights under the federal fair housing laws. 27 Such
practices range from racially motivated firebombings, crossburnings, vandalism,
and sexual harassment to exclusionary zoning and insurance redlining.2 1 Most
importantly, for the purpose of this paper, a number of courts have held that filing
a lawsuit can constitute prohibited interference under section 3617.29
In United States v. Scott, 0 a group of neighbors filed suit in state court to
enforce a restrictive covenant to prevent the conversion of a residence into a group

a residential real estate-related transaction because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap,
familial status, or national origin.
24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(1). Section 100.400(c)(5) further prohibits "IrJetaliating against any person
because that person has made a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in a
proceeding under the Fair Housing Act."
24. Preamble, 24 C.F.R. ch. I, subch. A, app. I (1996). The Preamble has been eliminated from
subsequent editions of the C.F.R. as a result of the Executive Branch's Regulatory Reinvention project.
25. See. e.g., United States v. City of Hayward, 36 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1994); see also
SCHWEMM, supra note 4. at §§ 20.8 - 20.9.
26. See Michigan Protection & Advocacy Service v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 346-48 (6th Cir. 1994).
But see Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n, 685 F.2d 184 (7thCir. 1982).
Section 3617 is not limited to those who used some sort of 'potent force or duress,' but extends
to other actors who are in a position directly to disrupt the exercise or enjoyment of a protected
right and exercise their powers with a discriminatory animus. Under this standard, the
language 'interferes with' encompasses such overt acts as racially-motivated firebombings,
sending threatening notes, and less obvious, but equally illegal, practices such as exclusionary
zoning.
Babint, 18 F.23d at 347 (citations omitted). See also SCHWEMM, supra note 4, at 20.2.
27. Michigan Protection & Advocacy Services v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337. 347 (6th Cir. 1994).
28. See City of Hayward, 36 F.3d at 835; see also United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d
1179 (8th Cir. 1974) (discriminatory zoning); Johnson v. Smith, 810 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. III. 1992)
(crossburning); Stirgus v. Benoit, 720 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. 111.1989) (firebombing); Grieger v. Sheets,
689 F. Supp. 835 (N.D. III. 1988) (sexual harassment); Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208 (N.D.
11. 1985) (vandalism); Laufmnan v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
Compare Babin, 18 F.3d at 348. Mere "economic competition" may be beyond the reach of section
3617. See Michigan Protection & Advocacy Services. 18 F.3d at 348 (holding neighbors who outbid
group home for property did not violate § 3617). But see United States v. Hughes, 849 F. Supp. 685,
686 (D. Neb. 1994) (calling the 6th Circuit's decision "plainly wrong" in suggesting there is some sort
of economic competition exception to the Act). See also SCHWEMM, supra note 4, at 20.2(2).
29. See United States v. Wagner, 940 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Schroeder v. De Bertolo, 879
F. Supp. 173 (D. P.R, 1995); United States v. Scott, 788 F. Supp. 1555 (D. Kan. 1992); HUD v.
Grappone, P-H: Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. para. 25.059 (HUD AU 1993), available in 1995 WL
77544, at *3.
30. 788 F. Supp. 1555 (D. Kan. 1992).
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home for persons with disabilities." The state court found that the group home did
not violate the restrictive covenant, although it declined to award attorney's fees
to the group home defendants because it found the plaintiffs' action was not
frivolous? 2 The sellers then filed a complaint with HUD which charged the
neighbors with violating sections 804 and 818 of the Act.3 In the resulting federal
district court case, the court held that the language of sections 804 and 807
encompassed enforcing restrictive covenants through the judicial process in order
to deny housing opportunities to persons with disabilities.34 The court granted the
government's motion for summary judgment, holding that the neighbors' attempt
to enforce a facially neutral restrictive covenant to prevent the group home from
residing in their neighborhood violated the Act.35
In other cases, courts have held that filing a lawsuit could constitute unlawful
interference under the Act. In Northside Realty Associates v. Chapman," a real
estate agent brought a state class action suit on behalf of all state real estate agents
and brokers against a fair housing testers group alleging interference with economic
relations, nuisance, trespass, unjust enrichment, and libel." Counterclaiming that
the broker's suit violated section 3617 of the Fair Housing Act, the fair housing
group petitioned for removal to federal district court. 8 In deciding against the
broker's petition for remand, the district court held that under the language of
section 3617 the defendant fair housing group should be allowed the opportunity
to show that the state court lawsuit had the effect of interfering with their rights
under the Act.39 Similarly, in Casa Marie Inc. v. SuperiorCourt ofPuerto Rico,4"
and Sofarelli v. Pinellas County,4' the courts held the lawsuits constituted
prohibited interference.4 -

31.
32.

See id. at 1556.
See id. The fact that the court found the suit was not frivolous has important implications for

the status of that suit under the First Amendment.
33.
34.

See id. at 1556-57.
See id. at 1562-63.

35.

See id. at 1562-63.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

411 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
See id. at 1197.
See id.
See id. at 1199-1200.
752 F. Supp. 1152 (D. P.R. 1990), rev d oi other grounds, 988 F.2d 252 (1st Cir. 1993).
931 F.2d 718 (llth Cir. 1991).
See id. at 724-25; Casa Marie, 752 F. Supp. at 1167-69.
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III. THE RIGHT TO PETITION
Treating a lawsuit as the basis for substantive civil liability can be problematic,
however, because lawsuits have traditionally been treated as a form of protected
speech under the First Amendment's right to petition. As discussed above, this
protected status has recently become a lively issue in fair housing enforcement, but
one that is often not well understood. 3 A closer examination of the history of the
right to petition reveals both its inherent limits and the way in which its scope can
be affected by the substantive statute at issue.
A. The History and Scope of the Right to Petition
The right to petition, as modern courts understand it, protects the free
expression of opinions regarding the government and requests for governmental
action. The First Amendment states that Congress shall make no law abridging
the right of the people "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."4 5
The right to petition extends to all parts of the government, and the right of access
to the courts is one aspect of it.46
The historical roots of the right to petition predate the Constitution. Its
development in English law can be traced to the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights
imposed by William and Mary in 1689, and it may date back as early as the tenth
century.47 In its original usage, the right to petition protected the right of
individuals to petition the government for a redress of public or private wrongs, and
it included an affirmative duty for the government to consider the grievance
presented.48 In the colonial period, the process for considering such petitions
blended legislative and quasi-judicial action and was an important means of

43. See, e.g., White v. Julian, No. C95-1757 MHP, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21899, at *15, *22-23
(glossing over the intricacies of petitioning law and stating broadly that "atall relevant times longestablished Supreme Court precedent upheld the right to participate in public debate and petition the
government for redress of grievances").
44. See Professional Real Estate Investors. Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 56-57
(1993); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. 365, 379-82 (1991); McDonald v.
Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985); see also Gary Myers, Antitrust and First Ainendnent hiplications
of Professional Real Estate Investors, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1199, 1234-41 (1994).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
46. See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 509 (1972).
47. See, e.g., McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482; Adderley v. Florida. 385 U.S. 39, 49-50 n.2 (1966)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (tracing the historical development of the right to petition, and noting the
protection of petitioning by the Magna Carta and the Stamp Act Congress of 1765); see also RONALD
D. ROTUNDA AND JOHN E. NOWAK, 4 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND

PROCEDURE 384 (1992) (hereinafter ROTUNDA AND NOWAK).
48. See Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition Governmentfir
Redress of Grievances. 96 YALE L. J.142, 142-44 (1986).
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addressing public matters of concern and private disputes. 49 Britain's failure to
respect colonial petitioning was protested in the Declaration of Independence."
The right to petition was included in the Bill of Rights, although Madison
initially proposed it as part of a clause guaranteeing the rights to assembly,
consultation, and petition, with a separate clause guaranteeing the freedoms of
speech and the press:" Congressional attention to the petitioning process
floundered under a growing burden of petitions, and ultimately sank during a crisis
over abolitionist petitioning in the 1830's and 1840's.52 The right to petition was
ultimately subsumed into an aspect of the right to free expression. 3
Modern interpretations of the right to petition focus on its importance in
furthering the democratic ,process. 5 4 The right to petition protects the right to
criticize government officials, to lobby the government to achieve one's goals, and
to go to court to protect one's interests or seek political objectives." Like the other
rights protected by the First Amendment, the right to petition does not confer
absolute immunity. 6 It provides no greater constitutional protection than other
elements of the First Amendment and has been treated similarly to the other

49. See id. at 144-58. Colonial legislatures frequently performed both legislative and judicial
functions. See id. at 145. Higginson notes that the petitioning process served to provide access to
otherwise unrepresented groups in colonial society, such as women and Indians, and even served as
means for slaves to gain their freedom. See id. at 153 (citing the approval in 1779 by the Connecticut
Assembly of an emancipation petition from a slave whose owner was aConnecticut resident whojoined
the side of the British during the Revolutionary War).
50. See id. at 155 n.92 (citing the Declaration of Independence para. 30 (U.S. 1776): "liin every
stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated
Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury").
51. See id. at 155-56.
52. See id. at 156-65. The House of Representatives adopted a gag rule in 1836 to stem the flow
of abolitionist petitions. This rule tabled without discussions petitions concerned with the abolition of
slavery. See id. John Quincy Adams succeeded in having the rule repealed in 1844. See ROTUNDA
AND NOWAK, supra note 47, at 384.
53. See Higginson, supra note 48. at 165; see also NAACP v. Button. 371 U.S. 415,452-53 (1963)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("IJlust as [freedom of expression! includes the right jointly to petition the
legislature for redress of grievances, so it must include the right to join together for purposes of
obtaining judicial redress.") (citations omitted).
54. See, e.g.. McDonald v. Smith. 472 U.S. 479, 489 (1985) (Brennan, J.. concurring) ("The
Framers envisioned the rights of speech, press, assembly, and petitioning as interrelated components
of the public's exercise of its sovereign authority.").
55. See id. at 485; Button, 371 U.S. at 430-3 1. It is well accepted that the act of filing a lawsuit
falls within the right to petition. See, e.g, Button, 371 U.S. at 430-31; McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484;
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited. 404 U.S, 508 (1972).
56. See McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482, 484-85.
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guarantees of free expression.
It is a fundamental tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence that it protects
speech without regard to the truth or popularity of the ideas that are offered, and
this protection necessarily extends to the right to petition.-" This protection is not
limited to political matters, but also covers business and other economic activity. 9
Courts have suggested, however, that litigation involving equal opportunity, as a
form of political speech, may deserve more protection than commercial litigation.
The Supreme Court in NAACP v. Button noted that litigation could not only be a
means of resolving private differences, but also a means for achieving lawful
political objectives like equality of treatment, and as such was a form of political
expression.6" In Creek v. Village of Westhaven,6" Judge Posner observed that "a
racial motivation, to the extent that it lent an ideological hue to the lawsuit, could
actually strengthen the case for regarding it as a form of petition for redress of
grievances or as an exercise of freedom of speech. 6 - However, in other contexts,
the Court has stated that litigation need not be "bound up with political matters of
acute social moment" to be protected.63
Although the right to petition extends to all branches of government, its limits
vary with the form of the petitioning activity at issue." Ithas been argued that

57. See id. at 484-85,488-90 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886, 909-912, 915 (1982)); United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22
(1967); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,40-42 (1966); Edwards v. South Carolina. 372 U.S. 229,23435 (1963); Button, 371 U.S. at 429-33; see also Jean F. Rydstrom, The Supreme Court and the First
Amendment Right to Petition the Governinentfor a Redress of Grievances, 30 L. ED. 2d 914 (1973)
(discussing the development of right to petition jurisprudence since the nineteenth century).
58. See Button, 371 U.S. at 444-45.
59. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945): ROTUNDA AND NOWAK, supra note 47, at 388.
60. See Button, 371 U.S. at 440-45.
61. 80 F.3d 186 (7th Cir. 1996)
62. See id. at 192 (citing Button, 371 U.S. 415; National
Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1015 (4th Cir. 1973) (en banc)). Judge
Posner made the same point inGrip-Pak, hic. v. Illinois Tool Works, hI.,694F.2d466(7thCir. 1982):
Some decisions state that the right to bring lawsuits, even of a purely commercial character,
is protected by the First Amendment, as a form either of petition for redress of grievances or
of speech. But we do not believe that the extent of protection is invariant to the nature of the
lawsuit - that the efforts of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
to use constitutional litigation to break down official segregation are entitled to no more
protection than the efforts of Illinois Tool Works to collect damages for an alleged theft of
trade secrets - or, if Grip-Pak is right, to drive a competitor out of business.
Id. at 470-71 (internal citations omitted).
63. See United Mine Workers of America, 389 U.S. at 223 (rejecting the contention that the
principles announced in NAACP v. Button apply only to litigation for political purposes); see also
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. at 531 ("The grievances for redress of which the right of petition was
insured, and with it the right of assembly, are not solely religious or political ones."). This
supra.
interpretation seems most consistent with the early history of the right to petition. See Part I1,
64. See Perry Educational Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) ("In
addition to time. place, and manner regulations, the State may reserve the forum for its intended
purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view."). See also
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various explicitly political forms of protected speech, such as speaking in town
meetings and contacting government officials and the media, should enjoy greater
immunity under the First Amendment than petitioning before the courts. In
practice, that appears to be the case.65 Scholars have noted that the Supreme Court
has long distinguished between the legislative and adjudicatory limits on
petitioning.66 "From the outset, the Supreme Court suggested a sharp distinction
between the political arena of the legislature and the adjudicatory setting ofjudicial
and administrative proceedings, with the latter category benefitting from a more
expansive sham exception and a correspondingly lesser degree of petitioning
immunity."67 Courts have "almost plenary power" to control the conduct of
prior restraints on speech in ways that
courtroom proceedings, and may impose
68
would be inconceivable elsewhere.
B. The Protectionfor Lawsuits Guaranteedby the Right to Petition is
Limited
The existence of substantive and procedural limitations on petitioning
protection for litigation is apparent in examples drawn from the common law (the
torts of abuse of process and malicious prosecution are frequently cited as

ROTUNDA AND NOWAK, supranote 47, at 308-09, 395.

65. See Franklin. supra note 16. at 1636 n. 139 (citing White v. Julian. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2116,
*2-3, 12-14 (N.D. Cal. 1996)).
66. See Lars Noah, Sham Petitioning as a Threat to the IntegritY of the Regulator" Process, 74
N.C.L. REV. 1,32 (1995).
67. See id.
68. See David McGowan and Mark A. Lemley. Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism.
Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 293, 384 (1994):
Courts may forbid the publication of material obtained in discovery to preserve the integrity
of the litigation process, control (within limits) media coverage of a trial, pass rules limiting
the right of attorneys to speak about a case, place gag orders on attorneys during a trial, and
sanction the filing of 'petitions' interposed for an improper purpose or filed without adequate
investigation.
infra, on Rule II. Courts can also limit the content and manner of
(citations onitted); see also Part II,
such petitions by applying the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. See Part II, itf.ra.
Similarly, McGowan and Lemley note that contact with administrative officials is also limited to
prohibit certain exparte communications with potential petitioners. See McGowan and Lemleysutra,
at 384. Limits on petitioning activity may be considered a function of the intrinsic nature of this right;
unlike the right to freedom of speech, which involves the freedom to publish information and opinions,
the right to petition preserves the right to be involved in the process of government and to have that
government hear one's grievances. Limits on the right to petition are essentially limits (established by
legislation or common law) on the kind of action that the government can take and, correspondingly.
the kinds of requests to act that it will hear.
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examples of common law limits on juidicial petitioning, as is the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine in antitrust law) and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 69 These
examples, along with a line of labor cases addressing retaliatory lawsuits, have
provided guidance forjudicial, executive, and congressional attempts to reconcile
fair housing enforcement with petitioning immunity.
1. Abuse of Process and Malicious Prosecution
Abuse of process is the misuse of a legal process, either criminal or civil, to
accomplish a purpose for which the "process" is not intended.7" Process is defined
as a direction or demand emanating from court authority." The mere institution of
an action or filing of a complaint is not sufficient to give rise to liability under this
tort.72 A legal or legitimate use of process cannot constitute abuse, regardless of
any improper motive of the user.73
Malicious prosecution is the malicious institution or continuation of a criminal
prosecution or civil suit, without probable cause, for purposes of harassment where
the suit ultimately fails, and results in damage to a person or their property.74 There

69. See. e.g. Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 470-71 (7th Cir. 1982). For
a discussion of abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine as common
law remedies for frivolous legal action, see Timothy P. Getzoff. Dazed and Confused ilt Colorado:The
Relationship Among Malicious Prosecution, Abuse of Process, and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine,
67 U. COLO. L. REv. 675 (1996). In addition, judicial doctrines like res judicata and collateral estoppel
also illustrate the judiciary's power to control the petitioning process. Res judicata bars relitigation of
claims that could have been raised in an earlier proceeding. See Grip-Pak, Inc., 694 F.2d at 469.
Collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of issues already litigated and decided in a prior suit between
the parties. See id. Both of the doctrines create constraints on the right to petition and illustrate the
broad authority to limit the form and conduct of petitioning that is accorded to the courts. However,
it is not clear whether these doctrines should be considered as restraints on the content of judicial
petitioning; more likely, they should be treated as restraints on the time, place, and manner of
petitioning, because they both address the repetition of prior proceedings.
70. See I AM. JUR. 20 Abuse of Process § I (1994); 72 C.J.S. Process § 106 (1987).
71. See I AM. JUR. 2D Abuse of Process § 2.
72. See id. However, filing a counterclaim can constitute "process" within the meaning of the tort.
See id. at n. 9.
73. See 72 C.J.S. Process § 108(b).
74. See 52 AM. JUR. 2D Malicious Prosecution § I (1970); 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 2
(1987). Cf. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S. 49, 62 n.7 (1993)
(stating that malicious prosecution "strictly speaking" covers criminal proceedings only). In addition
to injuries to person or property, reputational injury is sometimes protected. See id.
Malicious prosecution is an ancient tort. The Statute of Marlbridge amended it in 1269 by
including the first provision in English law permitting the recovery of costs by a defendant in a civil
action as a remedy for malicious prosecution. The law enabled a defendant in a maliciously prosecuted
action to recover his costs and damages. See 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 9.
The relevant provision of the Statute of Marlbridge is quoted in a 1943 malicious prosecution case,
Myhre v. Hessev:
And if any chief Lords do maliciously implead such feoffees, faining this case, namely, where
the feoffments were made lawful and in good faith, then the feoffees shall have their damages
awarded, and their costs which they have sustained by occasion of the foresaid plea, and the
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75

is no federal tort of malicious prosecution.
Abuse of process is similar to malicious prosecution in that both torts involve
the improper use of the courts. 76 The difference between the two is that malicious

prosecution involves maliciously causing process to issue, whereas abuse of
process involves the improper use of process after it has issued. 77 There is no
liability for abuse of process if the defendant has merely carried the process to its
authorized conclusion, even if with bad intentions; instead, some perversion of the
process, such as using aj udgment as a club for coercion or extortion, is necessary.78
In construing the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine of immunity for petitioning under
antitrust law, courts have analogized the doctrine to both torts, and have drawn
from them the conclusion that baseless or improperly motivated lawsuits may lose
their immunity.79

2. The Noerr-PenningtonDoctrine
The most widely referenced example for balancing First Amendment
protections with substantive prohibitions on improper litigation is the NoerrPennington doctrine, named for EasternRail Road Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc. and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, and

plaintiffs shall be grievously punished by amerciament.
Myhre v. Hessey, 9 N.W. 2d 106, 110 (Wis. 1943) (quoting pt. III of Cap. VI of the Statute of
Marlbridge, 52 Hen. 1I1).
75. See 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 2. The Supreme Court noted in Bill Johnson's that the
National Labor Relations Board's power to enjoin baseless state court suits was not limited by the
existence of state court remedies through malicious prosecution. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants v.
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 747 n.14 (1983).
Dual remedies are appropriate because a State has a substantial interest in deterring the filing
of baseless litigation in its courts, and the Federal Government has an equally strong interest
in enforcing the federal labor laws. The Federal Government need not rely on state remedies
to ensure that its interests are served.
Id.
76. See I AM. JUR. 2D Abuse of Power § 3 (1994).
77. See id.
78. See STUART M. SPEISER, ET AL., 8 THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 28.34, 205-207 (1991).
79. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 62-63, 73-75 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(quoting with approval Grip-Pak., 694 F.2d at 472: "The existence of a tort of abuse of process shows
that it has long been thought that litigation could be used for improper purposes even when there is
probable cause for the litigation .... "); see also Grip-Pak, 694 F.2d at 471 ("If all nonmalicious
litigation were immunized from government regulation by the First Amendment, the tort of abuse of
process would be unconstitutional--something that, so far as we know, no one believes."); Joseph B.
Maher, Comment, Survival of the Common Law Abuse of Process Tort in the Face of a NoerrPennington Defense, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 627 (1998) (arguing that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does
not define the scope of the First Amendment right to petition). The scope and basis of the NoerrPennington doctrine are summarized in Part H, infra.

extended by California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited.8" Analyses of
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine have been provided by a number of scholars and
practitioners; therefore, this paper will provide only a brief summary of that doctrine
and the points most related to the matter at issue here.8"
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine states that conduct seeking to influence
legislative, executive, or judicial action to eliminate competition is immune from
federal antitrust liability unless the conduct falls within the "sham exception.18 2 The
sham exception states that petitioning conduct which is ostensibly directed toward
influencing governmental action, but is in actuality merely a sham to cover an attempt
to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor, is not exempt
83
from antitrust liability.
Originally, Noerr-Pennington immunity was recognized only for attempts to
persuade the legislature or the executive to take action.84 In Noerr, a coalition of
trucking companies and their trade association invoked the Sherman Act against
several railroads. The trucking companies claimed that the railroads, attempting
to monopolize the long-distance freight business, had conducted a publicity
campaign intended to foster the adoption of anti-trucking laws and to create distaste
among the general public for the trucking industry, and had successfully lobbied
the governor of Pennsylvania to veto pro-trucking legislation.85 In ruling that the
Sherman Act does not prohibit attempts to persuade a legislature or an executive
to restrain trade or create a monopoly, the Court based itg decision on two
complementary justifications: the power of government to lawfully restrain trade,
and the right of private citizens to petition the government to do so.86 These two

80. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine
Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
81. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action:
The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80 (1977); McGowan and
Lemley, supra note 68; Robert A. Zauzmer, Note, The Misapplication of the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine in Non-Antitrust Right to Petition Cases,36 STAN. L. REV. 1243 (1984). For a discussion of
the history of the doctrine and its application, see ProfessionalReal Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 56-61
and 70-76 (Stevens, J., concurring). The ten volume treatise by Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp is

an indispensable resource. See generally PHILIP E.

AREEDA

& HERBERT

HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST

LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 148-259 (1997) (discussing
Noerr-Pennington doctrine and cases).
82. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136-144; see alsoProfessionalReal Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 56-57
(summarizing historical formulations of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine).
83. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144; see also Suburban Restoration Co. v. Acmat Corp., 700 F.2d 98,99
(2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Robinson, Civ. No. 3:92CV0345, at 15 (slip op.) (D. Conn. 1995).
84. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136; ProfessionalReal Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 56.
85. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129.
86. See id. at 136-138. The Court noted that to impose liability would:
[S]ubstantially impair the power of government to take actions through its legislature and
executive that operate to restrain trade. In a representative democracy such as this, these
branches of government act on behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the whole
concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known
to their representatives ....The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill
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justifications--the state action doctrine and the right to petition--underlie all
subsequent interpretations of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine.7
The judiciary expanded legislative petitioning immunity to encompass
petitioning before administrative agencies in United Mine Workers v. Pennington8
and courts in California Motor Transport.89 The California Motor Transport
decision left open the question of whether a litigant must have a subjective
expectation of success in order for the lawsuit not to be considered a sham.9" The
Court answered that question in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.9"
The Court held that in the antitrust context, an "objectively reasonable effort
92
to litigate" could not constitute a sham, despite any improper intent by the litigant.
The Court stated that Noerr-Penningtonimmunity covers lawsuits in which an
objective litigant could conclude that the suit is "reasonably calculated to elicit a

of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade those
freedoms ....
Id. at 137-38.
87. See generally McGowan & Lemley, supra note 68, at 293. They argue that because of
conceptual confusion in the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the scope of petitioning immunity recognized
by the Court has been broader than would be justified by the First Amendment. See id. at 300.
"State action" in the antitrust context is not the same as "state action" under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See AREEDA AND HOVENKAMP, supra note 8 1, at 357. Under the antitrust laws, the term
refers to "government policies that are articulated with sufficient clarity that it can be said that these
are in fact the state's policies, and not simply happenstance, mistakes, or acts reflecting the discretion
of individual officials." Id. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the term is more broadly defined, and
can even include private actions with a quasi-public character and the unilateral acts of state officials.
See id. However, Noerr can be read to protect petitioning to all levels of government, not merely those
whose actions can validly constitute "state action" within the antitrust laws, so that the right to petition
protected by Noerr essentially encompasses the Fourteenth Amendment definition of "state action."
Id. at 524-25.
88. 381 U.S. 657
89. 404 U.S. 508. Like actual lawsuits, threats of unfounded litigation may give rise to liability
under antitrust law. See AREEDA AND HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 237-39.
90. The language of the California Motor Transport decision raised the question ofwhether a single
baseless lawsuit is sufficient to create a sham. The Court stated: "[O]ne claim, which a court or agency
may think baseless, may go unnoticed; but a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which
leads the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and judicial processes have been abused."
California Motor Transport, 404 U.S. at 512-13. Most lower courts have recognized that this is an
illustration, rather than a requirement, and that a single lawsuit can indeed fall within the sham
exception, and the Professional Real Estate Investors opinion supports this interpretation. See Myers,
supra note 44, at 1231-33.
91. Professional Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. 49.
92. See id. at 57.

favorable outcome."93 The Court outlined a two-part definition of sham litigation.
First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless, so that no reasonable litigant could
expect success on the merits.94 If the lawsuit is objectively meritless, the court
should examine whether the lawsuit conceals "an attempt to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor" through the use of governmental
process, as opposed to the outcome of that process, as an anticompetitive weapon.95
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens dissented from this formulation, arguing
that it "might not be objectively reasonable to bring a lawsuit just because some
form of success on the merits--no matter how insignificant--could be expected."96
In setting forth the rule that subjective motivation does not determine whether
a lawsuit has a reasonable basis, the Court noted that it had applied the same rule
in another context--the National Labor Relations Act--by its opinion in Bill
Johnson'sRestaurants,Inc. v. NLRB, the decision that provides the best analogy

93. See id. at 60. "A winning lawsuit is by definition a reasonable effort at petitioning for redress
and therefore not a sham. On the other hand, when the antitrust defendant has lost the underlying
litigation, a court must 'resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by
concluding' that an ultimately unsuccessful 'action must have been unreasonable or without
foundation."' Id. at 60 n.5 (quoting Christainsburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22
(1978); accord Hughes v, Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-15 (1980) (per curiam)). "The court must remember
that '[e]ven when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have
an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit."' Id. (quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422)
(alteration in original). The Christiansburg decision involved a petition for attorney's fees brought
against the EEOC after it unsuccessfully sued the petitioner for racial discrimination under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. 412. Section 706(k) of that Act provides
that district courts may, in their discretion, award attorney's fees to the prevailing party. See id. at 422.
In considering the appropriate rule governing the award of attorney's fees for successful defendants, the
Court in Christianburg noted that "it has long been established that even under the American commonlaw rule attorney's fees may be awarded against a party who has proceeded in bad faith." 434 U.S. at
419. The Court further noted that it could not lightly presume that Congress had intended to distort the
judicial process by creating disparate incentives for plaintiffs and defendants. See id. The Court held
that an award of attorney's fees to a defendant in a Title VII case required a finding that the plaintiff's
lawsuit was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad
faith." Id. at 421. To allow attorney's fees against plaintiffs merely because they ultimately lost would
"undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII."
Id. at 422.
94. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60.
95. See id. at 60-61. The foundation for this reasoning is the complementary relationship between
the state action doctrine recognized in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), and the right to petition.
Because states were allowed under Parker to take action which would otherwise violate the antitrust
laws, the Supreme Court held in Omni OutdoorAdvertising that the antitrust laws "also do not regulate
the conduct of private individuals in seeking anticompetitive action from the government." City of
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1991).
96. Professional Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 68 (Stevens, J., and O'Connor, J., concurring).
The concurring opinion cited Judge Posner's decision in Grip-Pak, which argued that the existence of
the abuse of process tort shows that a lawsuit may be considered improper even when it has a reasonable
basis. See id. at 73-75 (citing Grip-Pak, 694 F.2d at 472). Therefore, according to Justice Stevens, the
difference between "sham" lawsuits and "genuine" lawsuits does not depend only upon the existence
of a reasonable basis. See id. at 75.
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for Fair Housing Act cases.

IV. BILL JOHNSON'S RESTAURANTS, INC. V.NLRB
One of the main sources of law regarding the interplay between petitioning
immunity for litigation with statutory limits on lawsuits is a line of cases drawn
from labor law, chiefly Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, in which the
Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining whether a lawsuit
violates a statutory prohibition on retaliation.

A. The Right to Petition Restricts the Power of the NLRB to Enjoin State
Court Lawsuits as Illegal Retaliation
In Bill Johnson's, the Supreme Court addressed the limits of the right to
petition in the context of an attempt by the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") to enjoin "retaliatory" lawsuits.98 The case grew out of an attempt by
waitresses at a Phoenix, Arizona restaurant chain to organize a union. When one
of the waitresses, Myrland Helton, was fired, allegedly as the result of her
organizing activities, she filed charges against the restaurant with the NLRB. 9
After an investigation, the NLRB issued a complaint on September 20, 1978, and
on the same day Helton and her colleagues picketed the restaurant."° The
restaurant manager confronted the picketers and threatened to "get even" with
them, and the president of the company made similar threats.'' Several days later,

97. See id. at 59 ("Indeed, by analogy toNoerr's sham exception, we held that even an "improperly
motivated" lawsuit may not be enjoined under the National Labor Relations Act as an unfair labor
practice unless such litigation is 'baseless."' Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731,
743-44 (1983).").
98. The court in Bill Johnson's framed its opinion in light of the question before it: whether a
lawsuit pending in state court could be enjoined as an unfair labor practice. See Bill Johnson's, 461
U.S. at 737. Section 3617 of the Fair Housing Act is similar to § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act
[herinafter NLRA], which makes it unlawful for an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed [by the NLRA]" and to "otherwise discriminate against
an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under [the NLRAI." See 29 U.S.C. §
I 58(a)( 1), (4). Therefore, the two acts may be considered sufficiently comparable for the reasoning in
Bill Johnson's to apply to the Fair Housing Act. But see discussion at Part B., infra, of United States
v. Robinson, a Title VII case, regarding distinctions between that case and Bill Johnson's.
99. See Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 733.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 733-34. Manager Sherrie Sturgeon:
[C]onfronted the picketers and took down their names. She said, 'You might think you're
funny, but I intend to have the last laugh. I will get even with you for what you're doing.' She
told Helton that 'I'll get even with you if it's the last thing I do.' That afternoon, [president]
Gene Johnson telephoned waitress Cheryl Nichols and asked to talk with her husband.

the restaurant filed a complaint in Arizona state court against the picketers, alleging
that they had libeled the restaurant, harassed customers, and created a threat to
public safety. °2 In response, Helton filed a second charge with the NLRB,
including, among other claims, an allegation that the petitioners had filed their state
court suit in retaliation for Helton's protected activities under the NLRA.1 3 The
NLRB issued another complaint, and after a hearing, an administrative law judge
concluded that the petitioners' state lawsuit had been filed for a retaliatory purpose,
lacked a reasonable basis, and therefore violated the NLRA's prohibitions on
05
retaliation." ° The Ninth Circuit enforced the Board's order.
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decision. In a unanimous
opinion by Justice White, the Court recognized that lawsuits may be used as
instruments of retaliation or coercion, but "the right of access to the courts is an
aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of
grievances."'0 6 Adopting the reasoning of CaliforniaMotor Transport,the Court
held that the First Amendment does not protect lawsuits that lack a reasonable
basis.0 7
The Court held that the NLRB could enjoin prosecution of "a baseless lawsuit
with the intent of retaliating against an employee for the exercise of rights protected
by [the NLRA]."'O° It stated that the prosecution of a lawsuit may not be enjoined,
"regardlessof the plaintiff's motive, unless the suit lacks a reasonable basis in fact
or law."'"° Although the Court recognized that the NLRB could find that filing an
"unmeritorious" lawsuit for a retaliatory purpose constituted an unfair labor
practice, the NLRB could not enjoin that lawsuit unless it lacked a reasonable
basis.''
In an important footnote, the Court also recognized that its holding in this case
did not deal with suits that are beyond the jurisdiction of state courts because of

Johnson asked Carl Nichols why they had been picketing the restaurant. Carl said they were
protesting Helton's discharge. Then Johnson said that she would hate to see the Nichols lose
their new home, and also that she would hate to see them 'get hurt by all this.'
Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 1335, 1339 (9th Cir. 1981).
102. See Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 734.
103. See id. at 734-35.
104. See id. at 735-36.
105. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1981). The Ninth
Circuit found that the record supported the NLRB's finding that the restaurant's lawsuit lacked a
reasonable basis in fact and was filed to retaliate against Helton. The court pointed to the fact that the
restaurant produced no evidence to support its allegations of mass picketing, trespass, and libel. See
id. at 1342-43.
106. See Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 740-41; see also Myers, supra note 44, at 1239 ("Bill Johnson's
Restaurants is undoubtedly the broadest application of the Noerr principle .... Moreover, Justice
White's opinion.., treats Noerrand California Motor Transport as analytical benchmarks for the First
Amendment, analogous to New York Tines and its progeny . .
107. See Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 743-44.
108. Id.
at 744.
109. Id. at 748 (emphasis added).
110. Seeid.at741.
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federal-law preemption or suits that have objectives that are illegal under federal
law. "' The Court stated that the NLRB could enjoin such lawsuits. 2
B. The Bill Johnson's Test
The Court's opinion, therefore, established a two-part test, with certain
important exceptions. In order for the NLRB to enjoin a lawsuit filed in state court
as an unfair labor practice, the lawsuit must: (1) lack a reasonable basis in law or
fact, and (2) have been filed with improper intent. If the state court lawsuit has
already been resolved and found "unmeritorious," however, the lawsuit may be the
basis for liability under the NLRA. In addition, lawsuits with illegal objectives and
lawsuits beyond the jurisdiction of state courts because of federal preemption can
be enjoined without a "no reasonable basis" finding, and presumably can be the
basis for substantive liability.
1. No Reasonable Basis And An Improper Motive
In attaching a meaning to the term "reasonable basis," the Court adopted the
standards employed in antitrust jurisprudence." 3 The Court cited with approval an
article restating the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine arguing that the First Amendment
interests involved in private litigation are not advanced by litigation "based on
intentional falsehoods or on knowingly frivolous claims."' "4
In evaluating whether a lawsuit lacks a reasonable basis, the Court stated that
while the NLRB need not limit its inquiry to the pleadings alone, suits that present
a genuine issue of material fact should not be enjoined.' 5 The plaintiff's First
Amendment interest in petitioning for redress of grievances, his interest in having
his claim heard by a jury, and the state's own interest in protecting its citizens
militate against allowing the NLRB to take over this factfinding authority." 6 The

111. See id. at 737 n.5. It is important to distinguish improper motives from illegal objectives.
Retaliation is an improper motive. See id. at 744 ("[W]e hold that it isan enjoinable unfair labor practice
to prosecute a baseless lawsuit with the intent of retaliating .... "). As an example of an illegal objective,
the Court cited cases upholding NLRB orders which enjoined unions from prosecuting court suits for
enforcement of fines that could not lawfully be imposed under the NLRA. See id. at 737 n.5.
112. See id.
113. See Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 743-44.
114. See id. at 743. Although the Court does not repeat this language elsewhere in the opinion, this
does suggest a standard closer to the subjective "reckless disregard" test enunciated in New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and later cases like St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968),
rather than the objective test later adopted in Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures,
508 U.S. 49 (1993).
115. See Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 745.
116. See id.

Court recommended that the NLRB look to the summary judgment and directed
verdict jurisprudence for guidance." 7 Similarly, in cases involving questions of
law or mixed questions of law and fact, the NLRB is required to leave such matters
to the state court, unless the plaintiff's position is "plainly foreclosed as a matter
of law or is otherwise frivolous."'"
Where a plaintiff wins a case in state court, the lawsuit is deemed to be
meritorious and cannot provide the basis for a retaliation claim." 9 Where the
plaintiff loses in state court, or where the case is withdrawn or otherwise shown to
lack merit, the NLRB may adjudicate its case, and may take into account the ruling
of the state court in determining whether the state lawsuit was retaliatory. 2 0 If a
lawsuit results in a judgment adverse to the plaintiff, it may be the basis for a
finding of liability.' 2' However, the decision does not appear to require the
conclusion that losing cases are necessarily unreasonable, and the concurring
opinion states that this is a policy decision for the appropriate government
22
agency.
The circuits that have addressed this question have varied in their interpretations of the Supreme Court's decision. In NLRB v. Vanguard Tours, Inc.,' the
Second Circuit rejected an administrative law judge's interpretation of Bill
Johnson'sthat any termination favorable to the defendants required a finding of no
reasonable basis.' 24 The court also rejected the NLRB's interpretation that a
termination favorable to the defendants gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of
no reasonable basis. 25 In NLRB v. InternationalUnion of Operating Engineers
Local 520,126 the Seventh Circuit upheld the NLRB's decision, based on Bill
Johnson'sand the NLRB's "consistent interpretation" of the NLRA that a lawsuit was
27
meritless because it had been finally adjudicated and the plaintiff did not prevail.'
The court denied enforcement of the NLRB's order, however, because the NLRB's

117. See id. at 745 n. 11.
118. See id. at 746-47.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 749.
122. See id. at 747, 749, 753 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Reasonable people could differ over the
wisdom of deciding that a nonfrivolous suit which is withdrawn, or in which the plaintiff ultimately does
not prevail, constitutes an unfair labor practice ... but that is a question of labor policy for the NLRB to
decide in the first instance."). It should be noted that Justice Brennan was concurring in the Court's
unanimous decision and none of the other justices joined in his concurrence.
123. 981 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1992).
124. See id.at 65. In summarizing the Bill Johnson's test, the Court held that "a pending lawsuit can
be an unfair labor practice only if it is retaliatory in motive and lacks a reasonable basis in fact or law.
Once the suit has been adjudicated, however, the standard is less forgiving to persons who have filed
a retaliatory suit. If the plaintiff has lost on the merits-even if he had a reasonable basis in bringing
suit-the Board may consider the filing of the suit to have been an unfair labor practice." Id.
125. See id. at 65-66.
126. 15 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 1994).
127. See id. at 679.
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finding of retaliatory motive was not adequately supported by the evidence.121
Similarly, in Diamond Walnut Growers,Inc. v. NLRB,129 the Ninth Circuit upheld an
NLRB decision that a state libel suit, which had been dismissed by demurrer, was
retaliatory and an unfair labor practice. 30 The court rejected the appellant's argument
that the NLRB erred when it failed to make a finding that the appellant's lawsuit
lacked a reasonable basis.' 3' It stated that whether a lawsuit lacks a reasonable basis
is relevant only to whether the NLRB can enjoin the lawsuit, and that "bringing an
action that proves unmeritorious can constitute an unfair labor practice even though
the suit did not lack a reasonable basis ... at the time it was filed."' 32 It also stated
that the cases relied on by appellant--including ProfessionalReal EstateInvestors-were not on point. 3
The second prong of the test is whether the lawsuit was brought with an
"improper motive." The Court in Bill Johnson'slooked to the substantive law at
issue for guidance on the issue of its improper motive analysis and determined that,
for the purposes of that case, "retaliatory motive" is the second prerequisite to the
issuance of an injunction, as well as the basis for a finding that a lawsuit
constituted an unfair labor practice.' 34 The determination of motive is a question
of fact.' 35
Similarly, in the antitrust context, the second tier of the analysis is one that
addresses the substantive violation at issue. The Noerr-Penningtonsham analysis
requires consideration of whether the lawsuit "conceals 'an attempt to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a competitor,' .. . through the 'use [of]
the governmental process--as opposed to the outcome of that process--as an

128. See id. at 679-80.
129. 53 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 1995).
130. See id. at 1090.
131. See id.
at 1088-89.
132. See id. at 1088.
133. See id.
134. At issue were Sections 8(a)(1) and (4) of the NLRA, which make it unlawful for an employer
to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed" by that act or
to "discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given
testimony" under that act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (4). The improper motive at issue was
"retaliatory purpose," which the Court drew from the ALl's opinion. The AIJ noted that there was
direct evidence that the suit had been filed for a retaliatory purpose and that the suit "violated the
[National Labor Relations] Act because it was 'an attempt to penalize [the complainant] for having filed
charges with the Board, and to penalize the other defendants for assisting [the complainant] in her
protest of the unfair labor practice ....
"'Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 736
(1983).
135. See NLRB v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers Local 520, 15 F.3d. 677, 679 (7th Cir. 1994)
(holding that NLRB's decision that suit was retaliatory was not substantially supported by
circumstantial evidence of retaliatory motive).
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anticompetitive weapon."'

6

2. The Illegal Objective Exception.
In adopting this two-part test, the Court noted that its ruling dealt only with a
particular kind of case: one involving a "lawsuit that federal law would not bar
except for its allegedly retaliatorymotivation."'37 It distinguished this fact pattern
from situations involving suits in which federal law preempts state court
jurisdiction or suits with objectives that are illegal under federal law.' 38 The Court
recognized its own history of upholding NLRB injunctions against unions suing to
enforce fines that could not lawfully be imposed.'39
Several circuits picked up the illegal objective exception in cases under the
4
NLRA. 40 In InternationalLongshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. NLRB,' '
the D.C. Circuit held that a union's challenge of an NLRB award in state court was
an attempt to enforce a contractual claim that was preempted by the NLRB ruling
and, therefore, met the illegal objective standard.' 42 It read the Bill Johnson's
decision as distinguishing suits that have an illegal objective from those that federal
law would not bar but for their improper motivation. The court reasoned that, in
suits with illegal objectives, "the plaintiff's motivation and the reasonable basis of
the action presumably is irrelevant."' 43 The court held that the union's "squarely
contrary" contract claim constituted an illegal attempt to coerce an employer in

136. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993)
(quoting City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991) (emphasis in
original)). Professor Myers argues that litigation which is objectively unreasonable likely will have
been initiated for anticompetitive reasons, making the second prong of the Professional Real Estate
Investors test redundant. See Myers, supra note 44, at 1226.
137. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 737 n.5 (emphasis added).
138. See id.
139. See id. (citing Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers Union, 187 N.L.R.B. 636, 637 (1970),
enforcement deniedsub non NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., 446 F.2d 309 (1st Cir. 1971), rev 'd, 409
U.S. 213 (1972); Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 185 N.L.R.B. 380, 383
(1970), aff'd in relevant part sub nora Booster Lodge No. 405, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 459
F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd 412 U.S. 84 (1973)); see, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers
Local 776 v. NLRB, 973 F.2d 230, 235-36 (3d. Cir. 1992); International Longshoreman's &
Warehouse's Union v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 1407, 1414 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
140. See e.g., Chauffeurs, 973 F.2d at 235-36; Int'lLongshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 884
F.2d at 1414.
141. 884 F.2d 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
142. See id. at 1414; see also Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1249, 1264-65
(9th Cir. 1983) (remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with just-released opinion in Bill
Johnson's).
143. See International Longshoreman's & Warehouse's Union, 884 F.2d at 1414. In Bill Johnson's,
the facts "presented a delicate issue of the legitimacy of the Board's prohibition of a party's recourse
to state legal remedies not generically preempted." Id. The court did not find the union's motive or the
reasonableness of its claims relevant, because the NLRB's decision effectively preempted the union's
argument under its collective bargaining agreement. See id.
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In Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 776 v. NLRB, 45 the Third Circuit
relied on the illegal objective standard in upholding a similar injunction against a
federal suit. 146 In this case, the union continued to seek enforcement of an award
granted by the contract arbitrator, despite a prior decision on the case by the NLRB
holding that the arbitrator's decision had been superseded by a subsequent decision
and order by the NLRB.' 47 The NLRB argued that the union's continual attempts
to press its contractual claim unlawfully restrained and coerced the warehouse
employees and attempted to cause their employer to discriminate against them, and
48
that it constituted an illegal attempt to change the scope of the bargaining unit.
The Third Circuit interpreted the distinction between the two-part test and the
illegal objective exception in Bill Johnson'sto lie in "the plaintiff's objective goals
in bringing the action."'' 49 It summarized the lawsuit in Bill Johnson's as seeking,
"on the surface," objectives that were not illegal under federal law.' The lawsuit
before the Third Circuit did have an illegal objective (circumventing the NLRB's
decision), and the union could not obtain the relief it sought no matter what
evidence it produced.' 5' The court analogized the union's position to that of a
litigant subject to Rule 11 sanctions because of its objectively unreasonable

144. See id.
145. 973 F.2d 230 (3rd. Cir. 1992).
146. See id. at 235-36. In a civil rights case predating the Fair Housing Act and the Bill Johnson's
decision, the Ninth Circuit applied a test similar to the illegal objective standard, analogizing it to the
common-law abuse of process claim. See Mayer v. Wedgwood Neighborhood Coalition, 707 F.2d
1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 1983). The plaintiff, who had been frustrated with his attempts to build lowincome housing by defendants' administrative proceedings and court actions, sought damages from the
defendants under § 1985, and the defendants counterclaimed for attorneys' fees under § 1988. See id.
at 1021. In its analysis of the fee claim, the court ruled that plaintiff's claim was not frivolous, citing
a Third Circuit decision indicating that "an abuse of process that results in a deprivation of
constitutional rights can give rise to a § 1983(5) action. See id. at 1023 (citing Jennings v. Shuman,
567 F.2d 1213, 1220-21 (3d Cir. 1977)). "While normally protected by the First Amendment, the
invocation of administrative or judicial proceedings may be tortious and actionable if employed for a
purpose that is unlawful and is other than and in addition to the goal sought openly in the proceeding
itself." Id. at 1022-23 (citing, among others, California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508, 513-15 (1972) (emphasis added). See Chauffeurs, 973 F.2d at 232-33.
147. See Chauffeurs, 973 F.2d at 232-33.
148. See id. at 232-233.
149. See id. at 236 (emphasis added). The court recognized that "[tihe difference between a lawsuit
brought because of the plaintiff's retaliatory motivation and a lawsuit with an illegal objective under
federal law is subtle, for it may be possible for a retaliatory suit to have an illegal objective." Id.
150. See id. "On the surface, as the suit did not seek objectives which were illegal under federal law,
it had legitimate goals and, depending upon the proofs at trial, could have been won by the plaintiff.
... Thus, in Bill Johnson's, the Court indicated that the suit could be restrained as an unfair labor
practice only if the plaintiff had an improper motivation, a subjective criterion." Id.
151. See id.

position, and stated that the litigant's "subjective good faith" would not defeat
liability. 52
It is not clear from the cases interpreting the illegal objective exception whether an improper motive is also required to find a violation under the illegal objective
exception, but it appears not to be. The Third and D.C. Circuit opinions
interpreting the illegal objective exception required only that the NLRB show that
a state court plaintiff had effectively violated the NLRA by filing a lawsuit that was
"contrary" to the Board's prior decision.' 53 In Chauffeurs, Teamsters, & Helpers
Local 776, the Third Circuit appeared to hold that, under the illegal objective
exception, no showing of retaliatory motive was necessary to prove a violation
where the union attempted to enforce an arbitration award contrary to the NLRB's
previous decision. 54 It agreed with the NLRB's holding that an illegal objective
is something other than a retaliatory motive and that the Board may restrain a
lawsuit with an illegal objective even if it is "otherwise meritorious."' 55 In
InternationalLongshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, the D.C. Circuit stated
that the issue of motivation was not relevant under the illegal objective
exception.' 56 The NLRB decided that the union's "collateral attack" on the
NLRB's order was "coercion" under Section 8(b) of the NLRA.'57
It should be noted that the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine did not recognize an
equivalent exception for "illegal" state court litigation; however, that does not mean
that the circuit court decisions applying the illegal objective exception are suspect.
The difference seems to lie in the fact that, as recognized in City of Columbia v.
Omni Outdoor Advertising, 5 ' the Court limited the Sherman Act and exempted
anticompetitive restraints imposed by the states based on state sovereignty
principles and federalism.'59 Therefore, the conflict between federal and state
authority under the NLRA that the illegal objective and federal preemption
exceptions address has no analogy under the antitrust laws. 6° On the contrary, in
the antitrust context, the state has clear authority in some situations to ignore the
federal law. The illegal objective exception might be considered somewhat
analogous to the point made by the Court in Professional Real EstateInvestors that
litigation that is "objectively baseless" loses its Noerr immunity.' 6 ' Where federal

152. See id.
153. See hit'l Longshoremen's& Warehousemen'sUnion,884 F.2d 1407, 1413-14; Chatiffeurs, 973
F.2d at 236.
154. See Chauffeurs, 973 F.2d at 236.
155. See id.
156. See hiternational Longshoremen's, 884 F.2d at 1414.
157. See id. at 1413. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D), the provision at issue, made it an unfair labor practice
"to threaten, coerce, or restrain" any person covered. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(D) (1982).
158. 499U.S.365(1991)
159. See id.
160. See infra
notes 140-43 and accompanying text (discussing state action doctrine in antitrust law).
161. See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60 n.5
(1993).
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law trumps state law, the state law action could be considered objectively baseless;
however, under the Bill Johnson's formulation, the suggestion would be that an
improper motive is also a necessary prerequisite for liability, and that does not
appear to be the case.
3. The State Action Doctrine
The illegal objective exception highlights the importance of the state action
doctrine in understanding Noerr-Penningtonand BillJohnson's and, consequently,
in determining how to apply these precedents in other contexts.
The existence of the state action doctrine in antitrust law derives in part from
the fact that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to preempt state laws, and
the courts have not inferred it has such an effect.' 62 During debate on that Act,
Senator Sherman himself stated that his bill was intended "to supplement the
enforcement of the established rules of the common and statute law by the courts
of the several states... "63 According to Professor Areeda, "Congress has never
expressed the least willingness to limit state antitrust by making federal antitrust
'occupy the field."" ' However, a state or local government act may be preempted
on its face when its requirements compel a result that the federal antitrust laws
clearly prohibit. 6 '
Under the NLRA, however, there is no equivalent grant of authority to the
states. In his concurring opinion in Bill Johnson's,Justice Brennan addressed the
issue of federal preemption of state authority. He noted that, "with regard to labor
disputes, federal pre-emption of state law is the rule, not the exception."' 66
However, in enacting those laws, Congress did not completely preempt state law.
The Court had previously held, in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers,'67 that Congress
had not preempted the right to sue in state court for defamation occurring in
connection with a labor dispute.'68 Therefore, while it appears that the right to
petition in cases under the NLRA is not supported by the broad state action
doctrine available under the Sherman Act, the right to petition in Bill Johnson's
was buttressed by a legitimate state interest that had not been preempted by federal
law.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See AREEDA AND HOVENKAMP, supranote 8 1, at 308, 319-22.
Id. at 293 (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 2456-2457 (1890)),
See id. at 294.
Id. at 387.
Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 753 (Brennan, J., concurring).

167. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
168. Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 752-53 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Linn, 383 U.S. 53).

V. THE RIGHT TO PETITION IN FAIR HOUSING CASES
Given a similar concern with preempting state law, the NLRA appears to be
more analogous to the Fair Housing Act than the Sherman Act is, and it might be
expected that Bill Johnson's and its progeny would furnish the appropriate
precedent for courts examining the limits of petitioning immunity for lawsuits in
the fair housing context. This has been the case. However, several members of
Congress have attempted to chart a different course, one based on Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A. In FairHousing Cases, Courts Have Accepted Bill Johnson'sAs the
Relevant Precedent
To date, two federal district courts (Texas and Connecticut) have considered
the question of when a lawsuit loses its petitioning immunity and violates the Fair
Housing Act. Both cases involved attempts to locate homes for children with
disabilities in residential neighborhoods. Although those courts have differed in
approaches, both held that Bill Johnson's provided the proper framework for
determining when a lawsuit violates the Act. In the first case, United States v.
Robinson,'69 the court refused to apply the illegal objective exception to a lawsuit
challenging the right of a family with a number of foster children to reside in a
neighborhood zoned for single-family use. 7 In the second case, United States v.
Wagner,"7' the court held that a lawsuit to enforce a restrictive covenant to prevent
a group home for children with disabilities from purchasing a house in a singlefamily neighborhood fell within the illegal objective exception and, additionally,
lacked a reasonable basis in law.' 72
In United States v. Robinson, the question of whether the Bill Johnson's
standard should be applied under the Fair Housing Act was considered in federal
court for the first time.' 73 In considering whether the zoning suit at issue
constituted unlawful retaliation under the Fair Housing Act, the Robinson court
held that Bill Johnson'sprovided the appropriate precedent, being "particularly on

169. Civ. No. 3:92CV0345 (slip op.) (D. Conn. 1995).
170. See id. at 20-26.
171. 940 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
172. See id. at 978.
173. See Robinson, Civ. No. 3:92CV0345 (slip op.) (D. Conn. 1995). Members of a neighborhood
association in New Haven, Connecticut filed suit against a family attempting to move into that
neighborhood. The suit alleged that occupancy of the property by the family, which had seven adopted
children and three foster children, all with disabilities, would violate the neighborhood's single-family
zoning designation. The plaintiffs' suit sought an order barring the defendants from occupying the
property unless they obtained a variance or a special use permit. The suit also sought a temporary
restraining order, on the grounds that occupancy by the defendants would cause the plaintiffs imminent
harm by diminishing the attractiveness and value of their property and infringing upon their use and
quiet enjoyment of that property. See id. at 2-5.
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point because it involved a construction of a statute which Congress drafted to
reach... discrimination or coercion."' 7 4 The court found that "the act of filing the
state lawsuit alone forms the basis for the [Fair Housing Act] violations alleged in
this action, placing the defendants within the heartland of the Petition Clause."' 75
Relying on Noerr, which stated that "the right of petition is one of the freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to
Congress an intent to invade these freedoms,"' 76 the court considered the legislative
history of the Fair Housing Act and determined that it did not demonstrate any
Congressional intent to prohibit a well-founded lawsuit without some showing that
the lawsuit was intended to effectuate "illegal extra-judicial conduct."' 77 The court,
invoking the Bill Johnson'stest, held that the defendants' motion to dismiss must
be granted if their state court lawsuit had a reasonable basis in fact or law.' 78
The issue of whether a lawsuit can violate section 3617 of the Fair Housing
Act also came up in United States v. Wagner.'79 The Pines claimed that a lawsuit
brought to enforce allegedly discriminatory deed restrictions violated the Fair
Housing Act. The court found that the defendant homeowners had filed their
lawsuit with the intent to interfere with the Pines' rights under the Act because of
the disabilities of the prospective residents of their house. The court also found
that filing the lawsuit constituted a violation of section 3617 of the Act. 8'

174. Id. at 26 n. 25.
175. Id.at 23.
176. See id. at 138.
177. See Robinson, Civ. No. 3:92CV0345 at 26 (citing Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 743).
178. See id. at 26. After consideration of applicable zoning law, the court concluded that, from the
perspective of a reasonable litigant, the lawsuit presented a genuine issue of law, and the defendants'
motion to dismiss was granted. See id. at 33-34, 37 (adopting the Bill Johnson's decision as guiding
its analysis of the case, and explicitly rejecting the Noerr-Penningtonstandard). In its discussion, the
court stated that the reasonableness of the lawsuit at issue should be viewed from the perspective of an
objective litigant at the time the suit was filed. See id. at 33-34. It also stated that the fact that a party
does not ultimately prevail is not dispositive with regard to the reasonableness of the lawsuit. See id.
at 34. It is worth noting that in Robinson, the Department of Justice argued that the plaintiffs'conduct
violated the BillJohnson'sstandard both because the lawsuit had an illegal objective and because it had
no reasonable basis in law and fact and had an improper motive. See id. at 14, 20-21. The court
rejected the illegal objective argument. See id. at 20-26.
179. United States v. Wagner, 940 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Tex. 1996). In Wagner, a group of
homeowners in a subdivision in Fort Worth filed a state lawsuit against their neighbors, the Pines, to
prevent them from selling their home to a local mental health organization, which planned to use the
house as a group home for six mentally retarded children. The homeowners claimed that the sale
violated a deed restriction and sought temporary and permanent injunctions against the sale. See id.
at 973. The homeowners also circulated leaflets and petitions opposing the use of the house as a group
home for retarded children. See id. at 973-78. The Pines filed a complaint alleging that the
homeowners violated section 3601 et seq. of the Fair Housing Act, and the Department of Justice
charged the homeowners with violating Section 3617. See id. at 978.
180. See id. at 978-80.

Rejecting the defendants' argument that Noerr-Pennington provided the
relevant framework, the court applied the Bill Johnson's standard and found that
the First Amendment did not protect the lawsuit.' 8 ' The court noted that NoerrPennington was an antitrust doctrine and was not constitutionally mandated by the
First Amendment. 82
' Although it did not specifically recognize Bill Johnson'sas
the relevant precedent, the court expressly adopted the Bill Johnson'stest urged by
the Government, and further held that it could consider the defendants' other
protected speech activities as evidence of improper motive. 83
The court found that the defendants' lawsuit had both an illegal objective and
was improperly motivated and lacking in a reasonable basis.' 84 In analyzing the
illegal objective exception, the court looked at both federal and state law and found
that because both prohibited the use of restrictive covenants to prevent the property
from being used as a group home, the defendants had sought an objective that was
illegal under both federal and state law.' 85 It rejected the defendants' contention
that the objective of the lawsuit was to "enforce a facially valid deed restriction,"
stating that the evidence of the defendants' conduct showed that the illegal purpose
of the lawsuit was to prevent the use of the property as a group home.' 86
Furthermore, the court found that "ample authority" existed that showed the
lawsuit violated both the Fair Housing Act and state law. In addition, evidence at
trial showed that the defendants' attorneys did not have support for arguments to
the contrary.' 87 Evidence that the defendants knew of the proposed use of the

181. Order on Defendants' Joint Motion to Exclude Evidence of Defendants' Participation in
Constitutionally Protected Activities at 4-7, United States v. Wagner, 940 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Tex.
1996) (Civ. No. 3:94-CV-2540-H). The court found the leafletting and petitioning activities were
protected speech. See Wagner, 940 F. Supp. at 980-982; see also Memorandum Opinion and Order
on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Par. 14 of the Complaint at 13-16, Wagner (Civ. No. 3:94-CV-2540H).
182. See Motion to Exclude Evidence at 5-7, Wagner (Civ. No. 3:94-CV-2540-H). The court cited
for support Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Picture-Industries, hIc., 508 U.S. 49
(1993) and Coastal States Marketing, Inc. vHunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1364-65 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Noerrwas
based on a construction of the Sherman Act. It was not a First Amendment decision."). See id. at 5.
The court continued:
Defendants note that the Professional Real Estate Investors court stated: "Whether applying
Noerr as an antitrust doctrine or invoking it in other contexts, we have repeatedly reaffirmed
that evidence of anticompetitive intent or purpose cannot transform otherwise legitimate
activity into a sham." 113 S. Ct. at 1927 (emphasis added). Nonetheless, Defendants overlook
the fact that the "other contexts" language is limited by the remaining language that restricts
the holding to cases involving evidence of anticompetitive intent or purpose" [sic] rather than
cases involving improper motivation in general.
Motion to Exclude Evidence n.2, Wagner (Civ. No. 3:94-CV-2540-H) (alteration in original).
183. See Wagner, 940 F. Supp. at 980-82.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 980-81.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 981-82.
It appears that Defendants' lawyers completely ignored the federal [Fair Housing Act], federal
case law regarding group homes, the Equal Protection Clause, and the landmark case City of
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house as a group home for persons with disabilities was sufficient to demonstrate
that their suit was improperly motivated.' 8
The different outcomes in Robinson and Wagner may be attributable to the
different state interests involved. In Robinson, the court clearly granted some
deference to the local interest in zoning. The court's decision-that a lawsuit to
enforce a facially neutral ordinance that effectively discriminated against
individuals with disabilities presented a genuine issue of law-may result from an
unwillingness to invade the state's authority, despite a clear expression of
Congressional intent to override exactly that kind of discriminatory zoning. In
Wagner, on the other hand, the court showed little patience with the homeowners'
assertion that their suit was not brought out of any discriminatory animus. The fact
that the lawsuit was clearly contradicted by both federal and state law convinced
the court that the lawsuit fell within the illegal objective exception.
B. CongressionalProposalsto Amend the FairHousing Act Have Adopted
the Rule 11 Standard
There have been a handful of bills proposed in Congress over the last several
years which have attempted to expand the petitioning immunity for lawsuits under
the Fair Housing Act. These bills have rejected the two-part test that the courts
have drawn from Bill Johnson's and have instead put forth a standard closely based
One such bill was H.R. 3206, entitled "The Fair Housing
on Rule I L9
Amendments Act of 1998," which proposed to amend the Fair Housing Act by

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center. Instead, Defendants' lawyers apparently relied on a
summer intern's research memorandum limited to the constitutionality of I thel Texas Property
Code ....
Id. at 982 (citations omitted).
188. See id. at 982. The court held that it was not necessary to prove that the defendants intended
to coerce, intimidate, or threaten the Pines, or interfere with their rights. See id. at 979-80. Instead, the
court held that "[e]vidence that Defendants brought the lawsuit because of the handicaps of the
prospective residents is sufficient to prove liability ..... Id. at 980 (citations omitted). The court in
Wagner cited, among others, United States v. Scott, 788 F. Supp. 1555, 1562 (D. Kan. 1992)
("lWlhether motivated by animus, paternalism, or economic considerations, intentional handicap
discrimination is prohibited by the Act."). The Scott decision, however, primarily addressed an alleged
violation of § 3604 of the Act (although it did include a finding of liability under § 3617 as well), and
this formulation of motive is more appropriate for a finding under that section. See id. at 1560-62. The
Wagner court did note that "the Government and the Pines have probably demonstrated intentional
discrimination against the handicapped" in violation of § 3604, but the court declined to expand its
holding to include that violation because of the clear intentional interference violation under § 3617.
See Wagner, 940 F. Supp. at 980 n. 12.
189. See Michael P. Seng, Hate Speech and Enforcement of the Fair Housing Laws, 29 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 409,434-37 (1996) (discussing Rule II standards for sanctioning lawsuits and the
outcomes in Fair Housing Act cases).

adding a new section, "Protection of First Amendment Rights":
Sec. 821
(a) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to make the expression of an opinion or
the seeking of redress from public authority a violation of this Act.
(b) A party shall not be held liable or otherwise sanctioned under this Act for
engaging in litigation or administrative proceedings unless (1) the party does so for an improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary
delay or needlessly to increase the cost of the litigation or proceedings; and
(2)(A) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions of the party in the litigation
or proceedings are not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new
law; or
(B) the allegations and other factual contentions, for which the party in the litigation
or proceedings has the
burden of going forward with the evidence, have no
90
evidentiary support."'
While H.R. 3206 employed the structure of the Bill Johnson's two-part test,
it derived its language from Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Where Rule 11 provides that a litigant may be sanctioned based on an improper
purpose or a lack of reasonable basis in law or fact,' 9 ' H.R. 3206 tightened the
standard for Fair Housing Act sanctions significantly, by importing the Rule 11
language to define "improper purpose" and to establish the boundaries of the
92
"reasonable basis in law or fact" standard. _
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a modern response
to the ancient problem of what to do with baseless or improperly motivated
lawsuits.' 93 It allows courts to impose sanctions on attorneys or parties bringing

190. H.R. 3206, 105th Cong. (1998) (introduced by Rep. Bilbray for himself, Rep. Canady, and Rep.
Harman). (Please send this source). The bill further amends section 815 of the Fair Housing Act to
provide that parties must exhaust state or local administrative remedies before a state or local law may
be found to violate the Act, amends the familial status definition in section 3602(k), and adds
exemptions for state or local regulations requiring dispersal of residential facilities for individuals with
disabilities, state or local restrictions on the maximum number of unrelated drug addicts or alcoholics
who may occupy a dwelling zoned for single-family use, and other state or local restrictions on the
occupancy of residential facilities for individuals with disabilities, persons convicted of crimes, and
juvenile delinquents. See id.
191. SeeFed. R. Civ. Proc. 11 (1995).
192. See H.R. 3206, 105th Cong. § 821 (1998).
193. See William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rile / I-A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181, 195 (1985). Before Rule I I was amended in 1983, it provided only that a court could strike
a pleading found to lack proper support or intended to cause delay. See i. at 18 1. In 1813 Congress first
addressed abuse ofjudicial processes. See id. at 182. The Supreme Court has described the power ofcourts
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claims that have improper purposes, that are not warranted by existing law or by
a good faith argument for a change in law, or that lack evidentiary support for any
claims of fact.
Rule 11 states, in part:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing,
submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances, -(I) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiarv support or,
if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
94
specifically so identified, are reasonable based on a lack of information or belief.
Under the explicit language of the rule, all sub-elements must be present for
a pleading or motion to meet the standards of Rule 11. Therefore, according to the
rule, either an improper purpose (Rule I l(b)(1)) or a lack of reasonable basis in
law or fact (Rule 1 1(b)(2)-(4)) should be sufficient to allow a court to impose
sanctions. Circuit courts have differed, however, over whether an improper
purpose alone can warrant the imposition of sanctions for an otherwise nonfrivolous filing.'95 The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits state that sanctions
may be applied for complaints with improper purposes only if the complaint itself

toassess attorneys' fees for suits brought vexatiously or in bad faith as an "assertiolt[] ofhinherent power
in the courts to allow attorneys' fees in particular situations, unless forbidden by Congress." See Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 (1975); Schwarzer, supra, at 193. An early
English attempt to sanction lawsuits brought without probable cause is noted in Part I1.
supra.
194. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. II(1995) (emphasis added).
195. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the term "frivolous" as "a shorthand that this court has used
to denote a filing that is both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry." See
Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1991). The court further stated
that complaints which initiate actions are not filed for an improper purpose if they are not frivolous,
"even when the motives for asserting those claims are not entirely pure." See id.
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is frivolous.' 96 The First, Third, and Seventh Circuits have taken the opposite
approach, holding that an improper purpose alone is a basis for imposition of Rule
11 sanctions.' 97 Several also distinguish between complaints and other court
papers, indicating that special care must be taken to avoid penalizing the filing of
complaints merely on the grounds of improper purpose.'
Case law establishes that the standard for determining which claims are
frivolous under Rule II is, like the standard applied in Sherman Act cases, "an
objective standard, focusing on what a reasonably competent attorney would
believe."' 99 A court should not "'use the benefit of hindsight' but 'should test the

196. See Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450,458 (2nd Cir. 1995) (applying Townsend analysis);
Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) ("[A]
determination of improper purpose must be supported by a determination of frivolousness when a
complaint is at issue."); Burkhart v. Kinsley Bank, 852 F.2d 512, 515 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that
if a complaint is not frivolous, "then any suggestion of harassment would necessarily fail"); Robinson
v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1130 n.20 (5th Cir. 1987), overruled in part on other
grounds by Thomas v. Capital Security Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 872-73 (5th Cir. 1988) (commenting that
if a complaint is well-grounded in fact and warranted by law, the complaint by itself cannot constitute
harassment); see also In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 518 (4th Cir. 1990) (declining to decide whether
improper purpose alone supports sanctions, but stating that district courts should look to legal and
factual basis before deciding improper purpose).
197. See Lancelloti v. Fay, 909 F.2d 15, 20 (Ist Cir. 1990) (finding that either improper purpose or
lack of reasonable basis will justify sanctions); Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d
1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[Fliling a colorable suit for the purpose of imposing expense on the
defendant rather than for the purpose of winning Iwould be sanctionablel."); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp.,
835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating claims made not in good faith but for harassment or undue
delay can be sanctioned). This approach, if applied to § 3617 complaints under the Fair Housing Act,
would go beyond Bill Johnson's and Robinson, which recognize that, regardless of motive or purpose,
a lawsuit is protected by the First Amendment unless it lacks a reasonable basis or seeks an illegal
objective. See Bill Johnson's,461 U.S. at 749-50; Robinson, slip op., at 25-26.
198. Courts and commentators have expressed concern over the "chilling effect" of Rule 11. See.
e.g., Stissnan, 56 F.3d at 458 ("A party should not be penalized for or deterred from seeking and
obtaining warranted judicial relief merely because one of his multiple purposes in seeking that relief
may have been improper"); Schwarzer, stipra note 193, at 195 (stating that inquiries into subjective bad
faith may result in "inhibiting speech and chilling advocacy"); Note of Advisory Committee on Rules,
1983 Amendment ("The rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing
factual or legal theories"). This concern has been used tojustify the position that sanctions should not
be imposed for filings with improper purposes unless those filings also lack reasonable bases. See
Schwarzer, stlpra note 193, at 195-96.
In this respect, the Rule I I cases are similar to Bill Johnson's,which held that lawsuits, regardless
of purpose, are protected speech under the First Amendment, unless they lack a reasonable basis in law
or fact. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 748-749 (1983). While the
contexts of Rule I I and the First Amendment are different, the concern over the "chilling" effect of
sanctioning lawsuits is common to both, and that concern appears to have prompted courts to refrain
from allowing sanctions in both contexts based on improper motive alone. See id.
199. See McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 896 F.2d 17, 22 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting
Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co., 870 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir, 1989)), overruled in part oil other grounds
by Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1990).
Similarly, Robinson endorsed a test of reasonableness based on "the perspective of an objective
litigant at the time the state lawsuit was filed." See United States v. Robinson, Civ. No. 3:92CV0345
at 34 (slip op.) (D. Conn. 1995).
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conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading,
motion, or other paper was submitted.'' '
VI. FINDING THE PROPER FAIR HOUSING ACT STANDARD
The Supreme Court's decision in New York Times v. Sullivan21' opted to
overprotect speech not traditionally protected by the First Amendment.2 12 In New
York Times, the Court established the "actual malice" standard to protect certain
false statements of fact, ordinarily not covered by the First Amendment, in order
to ensure that protected speech involving the criticism of government officials was
not punished by mistake.0 3
Should courts establish similar overprotection for the right to petition? Should
lawsuits that are used to discriminate receive immunity in order to avoid a chilling
effect on legitimate petitioning? Or should such lawsuits instead be punished, in
order to effectuate the goals of the Fair Housing Act, even at the risk of discouraging lawful litigation ?2 ' To understand the limits of the right to petition in this
context, it is necessary first to consider the interplay of the federal and state
interests at stake.
The Bill Johnson's and the Noerr-Penningtoncases are the chief source of
guidance on the right to petition. As discussed earlier, the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine is a product of the interplay between the Sherman Act, the state action
doctrine, and the right to petition.20 5 Similarly, Bill Johnson's represents a careful

200. See McGhee v. Sanilac County, 934 F.2d 89, 93 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting INVST Fin. Group.
Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc., 815 F.2d 391, 401 (6th Cir. 1987).
201. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
202. See Frederick Schauer. Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment: Unraveling the 'Chilling Effect.'
58 B. U. L. REV. 685, 706-07 (1978); McGowan and Lemley, supra note 68.
203. See Schauer, supra note 202. at 707.
204. See id.; see also McGowan and Lemley, supra note 68. at 392-93. While courts have found
some speech to be deserving of overprotection, such as criticism of public officials as in New York
Times v. Sullivan, some speech should be deterred, because of the costs it imposes on society and the
lack of benefits it provides. See id.
Congressional hearings addressed the potential chilling effect of HUD's enforcement actions. See
First Amendment Impact of HUD Enforcement Actions Criticized, 22 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 323
(Oct. 20, 1994).
205. According to McGowan and Lemley:
The state action and petitioning doctrines have some important things in common. First, both
doctrines deal with important questions involving the relationship between government and
its constituents ....

As stated in City ofColumbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, hi., at least

with respect to requests directed at state legislators or those vested with state authority, the
antitrust immunity doctrines 'are complementary expressions of the principle that the antitrust
laws regulate business, not politics; IParker] protects the States' acts of governing, and INoerrl
the citizens' participation in government.' . . . There is an additional similarity between the

balancing of the individual, state, and federal interests involved-an attempt to
reconcile the individual right to petition, recognized by California Motor
Transport, and the state's legitimate interests in providing remedies for conduct

affecting interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility,

' 20 6 With

the

authority of the federal government to set national labor policy. In doing so, the
Court found that the state's interest in protecting the health and welfare of its
citizens justified some degree of deference from the federal government. When
interpreting these cases, it is important to remember that not only
the right to
207
petition is at issue, but the relevant state interest involved as well.
It is clear, then, that the limits of the Constitutional protection for individual
petitioning when state interests are involved can be affected by the nature of those
state interests, as well as by the relevant federal statute. 20 1 In the Noerr-Pennington
cases, a strong state interest in trade regulation justified broad protection for
genuine, non-sham litigation. In Bill Johnson's, a greater amount of federal
authority and a correspondingly reduced state role in labor policy justified a
narrower exception: lawsuits that are merely "unmeritorious" can be the grounds
for liability under the NLRA, as can lawsuits that are preempted or that have
objectives prohibited by federal law.20 9 On the other hand, the state's interest in
providing a forum for legitimate disputes justified petitioning immunity for

doctrines, which helps to explain the confused state of the cases....
In both cases the Court
noted that the issue before it presented a potential conflict between important constitutional
principles and strict adherence to the antitrust laws. In both cases the Court construed the
antitrust laws so as to avoid the conflict ....
See id. at297-98 (citations omitted).
Many commentators ignore the importance of the state action doctrine in Noerr-Pennington
jurisprudence and focus entirely on the First Amendment principles implicated. See, e.g.. Myers, supra
note 44; Getzoff, supra note 69. This may be a source of much of the confusion surrounding the limits
of the right to petition.
206. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) (citing San Diego
Building Trades Counwil v. Garmon. 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)). As earlier cases had recognized.
because the NLRA provided no recourse for employers, they had the right to seek judicial protection
from tortious conduct during labor disputes in state court. See id. at 741-42.
207. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 453 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
This Court has repeatedly held that certain forms of speech are outside the scope Iof the First
Amendmentl and that, in addition, 'general regulatory statutes, not intended to control the
content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise,' are permissible 'when they
have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests.' The problem in each
such case is to weigh the legitimate interest of the State against the effect of the regulation on
individual rights.
Id. (citations omitted).
208. The suggestion of NAACP v. Button and Grip-Pak is that the individual's interest, as well as
the state's, should be taken into account. The modern interpretation of the right to petition as a right
of access to legislative, executive, and judicial fora may be the source of this ad hoc balancing test. As
the state is given some authority to limit petitioning, and as the right to petition, like speech, is not the
source of absolute immunity, the Court may be balancing the extent of that immunity with the
importance of the state interest involved. See Button, 371 U.S. at 441-43.
209. See Button, 371 U.S. at 441-43.
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210
nonfrivolous lawsuits before state courts, regardless of the litigant's motive.
This balancing framework seems appropriate for Fair Housing Act cases as
well. Similar to the NLRA, the Fair Housing Act was a broad attempt to set a
single, consistent standard for the nation. Congress explicitly preempted
conflicting state law in the area of housing discrimination. 2' Rather than
indicating any interest in protecting state interests in such issues, the language of
section 3615 indicates a clear intent to preempt conflicting state law. Because that
preemption is limited to conflicting state law, however, states retain their authority
to enact their own substantially equivalent fair housing statutes and to take other
action that does not violate the Act.212
In addition, a state has a legitimate interest in hearing certain disputes and
"protecting the health and welfare of its citizens," as stated in Bill Johnson 's.2 " In
CasaMarie, Inc. v. Superior Court of PuertoRico,2t4 the First Circuit found that
the Younger v. Harrisfederal abstention doctrine required the court to abstain from
hearing the Fair Housing Act claim. 2" The court held that "the district court should
have abstained, in the interests of comity and federalism, from interfering with
pending state court proceedings which implicate such vital state interests: namely,
the Commonwealth's important stake in protecting the integrity of the contempt

210. See id.
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (1994) ("[Alny law of a State, a political subdivision, or other such
jurisdiction that purports to require or permit any action that would be adiscriminatory housing practice
under this subchapter shall to that extent be invalid."). See id.
212. Title 42, § 3610 provides that the Secretary of HUD may certify state or local public agencies
as "substantially equivalent" for the purposes of enforcement under the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §
3610(f)(3)(A)(IV). Section 3615 provides that "[nlothing in this subchapter shall be construed to
invalidate or limit any law of a State or political subdivision of a State, or of any other jurisdiction in
which this subchapter shall be effective, that grants, guarantees, or protects the same rights as are
granted by this subchapter ......
213. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 745 (1983). In Bill Johnson's,
the Court stated that its analysis did not cover suits that are beyond the jurisdiction of state courts
because of federal law preemption. See id. at 737 n.5. The Court cited its previous decision in NLRB
v.Nash-Finch Co.. 404 U.S. 138 (1971), in which it concluded that "a District Court Icouldl enjoin
enforcement of a state-court injunction 'where federal [lawl preemptledI the field."' See id. at 737-38
n.5.
214. 988 F.2d 252 (1st Cir. 1993).
215. See id. at 262. The court also concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibited the federal
district court from enjoining the allegedly discriminatory state court action, because "Congress
contemplated concurrent state-federal court jurisdiction over Title VIII claims." See id. at 261. A
detailed discussion of the Anti-Injunction Act is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is worth
noting that the Supreme Court stated that the Anti-injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994), did not
preclude the NLRB from enjoining a state-court suit, since the purpose of the Act is to avoid conflicts
between state and federal courts where the litigants are private persons, rather than to "hamstring the
Federal Government and its agencies in the use of federal courts to protect federal rights." See Bill
Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 737-38 n.5 (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 146 (1971).

power as the ultimate means of ensuring compliance with the final judgments of
its courts, and of 'vindicat[ing] [the State's interest in] the regular operation of its
judicial system."' 't 6
Another state health and welfare interest that is frequently involved in fair
housing cases is the state's exercise of its zoning power .2 " The authority of a state
or locality to adopt zoning regulations and building codes derives from its
sovereign authority under the police power to take action to protect the health and
welfare of its citizens. 2 8 This authority was preempted insofaras it conflicts with
the Fair Housing Act and does not justify a broad exception for petitioning to
implement a "state action doctrine" similar to the one in antitrust law.
Therefore, the state's interests in regulating development to protect the health
and welfare of its citizens and in having questions regarding those regulations
heard by its own courts would seem to justify only a narrow exception under the
right to petition, similar to the one applied in Bill Johnson's. The Act's prohibitions on zoning against group homes bring those cases clearly within the Act's
coverage, and attempts to invoke facially discriminatory zoning rules against group
homes should fall within the illegal objective exception to immunity. 219 States

216. See Casa Marie, hIn.. 988 F.2d at 262 (internal citations omitted). In a more recent case,
Skipper v.Hambleton MeadowsArchitectiral Review Comin. No. CCB-97-3697 a federal district court
rejected a similar argument for abstention under the Burford and Colorado River analyses. See 996 F.
Supp 478,485-87 (D. Md. 1998). The court found that a neighborhood association's lawsuit to enforce
a restrictive covenant against a group home did not implicate a state regulatory scheme, so abstention
was not appropriate. See id. at 481. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 367
(1926).
217. See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 367 (1926).
218. See id. at 387. See also I ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 98-105 (4th ed. 1996)
(summarizing the effect of decisions upholding zoning rules under state or local police power).
219. The illegal objective exception may encompass more than facially discriminatory lawsuits, and
such lawsuits might be rejected under the "no reasonable basis in law" standard instead. See Bill
Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 743 (describing the "no reasonable basis" standard). What this proposed
interpretation lacks in subtlety, however, it makes up for in simplicity.
Franklin argues that the "illegal objective" approach is inappropriate in the fair housing context
as "inaccurate" and lacking a limiting principle. See Franklin, supra note 16, at 1628-29. This
argument, however, misconstrues the nature of the illegal objective idea enunciated in the NLRA cases.
Specifically, in stating that the illegal-objective test contains "an obvious circularity," this argument
confuses "illegal" with "not the law." See id. at 1629. For instance, when a litigant asks a court to
enforce a racially restrictive covenant, the litigant has attempted to petition the government to achieve
an illegal objective-that is. an objective specifically forbidden by federal law. See id. On the other
hand, when that litigant "asks a court to enforce a contract that is later deemed invalid, or to grant
immunity from tort liability where no such immunity exists ... ," that litigant seeks relief for which the
law does not provide relief, but he has not sought an illegal objective. See id. Although no remedy
exists in the second case, the litigant has taken no action for which the law says she should be
penalized; in the first case, however, she has attempted to use the petitioning process as part of her
pursuit of an end which has been proscribed, and the fact that she has done so through the courts, rather
than in some nonjudicial manner, will not immunize her conduct, See id.
It is not clear whether the illegal objective exception has its roots in the traditional limits to the
right to petition derived from the abuse of process tort or the malicious prosecution tort or in some other
source altogether. Because abuse of process requires no showing of intent, but only a showing of
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have a lesser interest in deed restrictions, which do not involve the exercise of the
state police power; therefore, lawsuits to enforce facially discriminatory restrictive
covenants should also fall within that exception.220
A lawsuit which does not, on its face, violate the Act, but which may have
been brought because of some discriminatory or retaliatory motivation, should be
addressed under the Bill Johnson'stwo-part test. 22' This category of cases includes
lawsuits involving the application of other permissible zoning rules. First, the court
should determine whether the claim is meritless or without a reasonable basis in
law or fact; if so, the court should determine whether filing the lawsuit violated one
of the provisions of the Fair Housing Act. 222 Violations might be proved using the
same methods available for proving other
violations of the Act, by showing either
23
disparate treatment or disparate impact.
This approach is consonant with the standard for petitioning immunity
established in Bill Johnson's, but it raises a serious problem, one familiar from
First Amendment jurisprudence-it allows the use of legal process to effect one's
discriminatory animus. 224 Unlike traditional First Amendment protection for the
expression of unpopular views recognized in cases like National Socialist Party of
America v. Village ofSkokie,22' however, granting immunity for legitimate lawsuits
brought for improper reasons goes beyond mere expression and effectively makes

"perversion" of authorized process to accomplish some harm, it may be the best analogy. However, as
discussed above, the mere institution of an action is usually not sufficient to establish liability for abuse
of process. In the NLRA context, as discussed above, filing a lawsuit with an illegal objective seems
to give rise to a presumption of retaliation or other "perversion" of the judicial process. See id.
220. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1947).
The power of the federal courts to enforce the terms of private agreements is at all times
exercised subject to the restrictions and limitations of the public policy of the United States
as manifested in the Constitution, treaties, federal statutes, and applicable legal precedents.
Where the enforcement of private agreements would be violative of that policy, it is the
obligation of courts to refrain from such exertions ofjudicial power.
Id. (citations omitted). See Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 748-49.
221. See Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 748-49.
222. As discussed above, the Bill Johnson's decision stated that adjudication of frivolous lawsuits
may be grounds for liability under the NLRA, and the court may also enjoin lawsuits that have no
reasonable basis. See id.
223. See generally SCHWEMM, suopra note 4, at § 10. Using the disparate treatment analysis, a
plaintiff may introduce direct evidence of discriminatory motive or may make out a prima facie case
based on circumstantial evidence. See id. at § 10.4(2)(b). In a case involving an allegedly
discriminatory lawsuit, discriminatory intent might be established in the absence of direct evidence of
motive by a showing that the defendant (and plaintiff in the prior suit) took frivolous or meritless legal
action against the plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class, and did not take such action against
similarly situated persons who were not members of the same protected class.
224. See Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 748-49.
225. 432 U.S. 43 (1977).

the courts active participants in the discriminatory behavior at issue. 2 6 This
outcome, however, runs counter to the principle, enunciated in CaliforniaMotor
Transport Co. v. Tracking Unlimited,227 that "First Amendment rights may not be
used as the means or the pretext for achieving 'substantive evils' which the
legislature has the power to control. 228 Surely using the courts as a means to give
effect to one's discriminatory animus could be considered just the sort of
substantive evil proscribed in CaliforniaMotor Transport.
Franklin suggests one remedy for this problem, arguing persuasively for an
intent-based standard for Fair Housing Act liability.2 29 Under this view, the validity

of the litigation is not a defense; rather, discriminatory or retaliatory intent alone
suffices to impose liability.230 In addition, groundless claims would also give rise
to liability under the Fair Housing Act. 3
A purely intent-based standard could prove unsupportable because it would
fail to give sufficient deference to the state interest in hearing legitimate grievances
concerning the application of its laws in particularly those involving its exercise of
the police power.232 The Bill Johnson's standard recognizes this, and it represents

226. For instance, under this analysis a homeowner who made a practice of filing legitimate,
nonfrivolous lawsuits against all of his minority neighbors to drive them from the neighborhood would
not violate the Fair Housing Act. However, the constitutionality of such litigation is uncertain under
the constitutional state action doctrine. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 2TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.3 (2d ed. 1992). According to Professors Rotunda and Nowak:
A court can uphold trespass convictions which are based on a private party's decision to refuse
to open their home or other private property to members of a racial minority. Ifa home owner
refuses to allow persons into his home because of their race he is allowed to have that decision
enforced ....
Id. at 546. On the other hand. cases like Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., hic, 500 U.S. 614
(1991), Georgia v. MeColnm, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), and J.EB. v. Alabania ex rel. TB., 511 U.S. 127
(1994), support the argument that governmental sanctioning of a private litigant's discrimination in
courtroom proceedings itself violates the Constitution. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 615 (holding that
excluding jurors from civil trial jury because of their race violates the Equal Protection Clause);
MeCollum, 505 U.S. at 59 (holding that using race-based peremptory challenges to exclude jurors is
unconstitutional); J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129 (holding that excluding jurors because of gender violates the
Equal Protection Clause).
227. 404 U.S. 508, 515 (1992).
228. See id. at 515.
229. See Franklin, supra note 16, at 1630-34.
230. See id. Franklin argues for immunity for plaintiffs who prevail in state court. See id. at 1632.
This immunity appears to bring his approach closer to the Bill Johnson's test. See id.;see also supra
notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
231. See Franklin, supra note 15, at 1632. It is not clear whether Franklin intends such liability to
apply to groundless claims that lack a discriminatory intent.
232. In addition, Franklin bases his argument for the intent-based standard on the idea, derived from
the abuse of process tort, that an otherwise well-founded lawsuit loses its right to petition immunity if
filed with improper intent. See id. at 1630. However, as noted above, the filing of a lawsuit for
improper reasons is the basis for a malicious prosecution, not an abuse of process, claim. The
difference between the two torts is subtle but important, because it forms the basis for the Supreme
Court's ruling in Professional Real Estate Investors, hic. v. Columbia Pictures Idustries, h1w. that
subjective motivation alone will not defeat First Amendment immunity for non-sham litigation. See
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a careful balancing of the state interests and individual rights with the goals of the
federal policy at issue.233 Some might argue that the goals of the Fair Housing Act
deserve greater deference than those of the NLRA, but existing Supreme Court
precedent does not indicate any willingness on the part of the courts to override
those individual rights and state interests by adopting a solely intent-based
standard. 3T
Instead, the outcome described above-in which nonfrivolous litigation is a
tool for discrimination-may be seen as the result, however unfortunate it may
seem, that the First Amendment requires. '35 Just as the freedom of speech allows
those with unpopular views to air them before the public, so the right to petition
allows them to bring their legitimate grievances before the government.236 In its
interpretations of the right to petition, the Supreme Court clearly stated that, in
most cases, improper motivation alone is insufficient to overcome First Amendment immunity.2 37 If there are limits on courts that prevent deciding such lawsuits
in favor of discriminatory litigants, those limits probably exist elsewhere in the
Constitution. 238 To adopt an intent-based standard would underprotect legitimate
judicial petitioning.
By the same token, the Rule l1-based standard proposed in H.R. 3206 might
actually overprotect discriminatory lawsuits by adopting a much stricter standard
for liability than the one articulated by the Supreme Court. -39 Where the interest
protected determines the scope of the protection granted, using a standard
developed to ensure the efficient conduct of litigation might not adequately address
the unique and important interests at issue in the fair housing context. By adopting
the language of Rule 11, H.R. 3206 would have significantly narrowed the Bill
Johnson's standard by eliminating the exceptions attributable to federal preemption
of conflicting state law and restricting the definition of "improper purpose." ,4 In

Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industries 508 U.S. at 60-61.
233.

See Bill Johnson 's,
461 U.S. at 740-43 (concluding that the NLRB's analysis of the state Act

is "untenable" in light of the First Amendment right of access to courts).
234. See id. at 749 (holding that although lawsuits instigated for retaliatory purposes are unfair, this
intent is not dispositive and will instead only be enjoined where "the suit lacks a reasonable basis-).
235. See id. at 742-43.
236. See id.

237. See id. For a discussion of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and the Bill Johnson sdecision, see
Parts II and Ill.
238. For a discussion of constitutional state action and Maver v. Wedgwood Neighborhood
Coalition, 707 F.2d 1020 (1983), see supra notes 80. 139, and note 129, respectively.
239. See H.R. 3206, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998).
240. See id.: FED. R. Civ. P. I1.H.R. 3206 also states: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to
make the expression of an opinion or the seeking of redress from public authority a violation of this
Act." If the principles of petitioning immunity are adopted for fair housing from antitrust law, what are
the implications for petitioning other than litigation? Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp state that
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doing so, H.R. 3206 would have expounded the level of petitioning immunity
beyond what the Supreme Court recognizes in other contexts. Although some
might view this expansion positively, as a way to increase the avenues of free
expression and political action available to the public, in the fair housing context
the effect would be to expand the immunity available to those who would use the
courts to discriminate against their neighbors.
The applicability of the Rule 11 standard to these cases is questionable because
Rule 11 is fundamentally a procedural rule. As discussed in Part I1above, the
authority of courts to limit courtroom petitioning in procedural matters differs in
nature from the authority of government to control petitioning in other contexts. 2
There is some precedent for relying on Rule 11 to establish the limits of petitioning
immunity: in ProfessionalReal Estate Investors, Justice Thomas referred to Rule
11 in deciding whether a lawsuit dismissed on summary judgment was objectively
baseless.24 - In response, however, Justice Souter cautioned in his concurrence
against construing the decision's citation of Rule 11 to "signal the importation of
every jot and tittle of the law of attorney sanctions." 43
VII. CONCLUSION
In the furor following the Berkeley case, the intent of the Fair Housing Act has
often been ignored. Congress wrote the Act to prohibit harassment and intimidation, by criminal and other means, of people exercising their rights to equal
opportunity in housing. When amending the Act in 1988, Congress intended to
eliminate the use of zoning rules and deed restrictions to discriminate against
people with disabilities. Although advocates of the right to protest group homes
may wrap their actions in the mantle of community concern, it is clear that bias
against persons with disabilities often plays a significant part in such opposition.244
For those inclined to act on that bias, lawsuits can be an effective means of
intimidating and harassing their enemies.
On the other hand, Professor Seng notes that civil rights groups have been "the
primary beneficiaries" of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.24- As the
Supreme Court recognized when it upheld the NAACP's attempts to use the courts

courts have been reluctant to recognize legislative petitioning to be the grounds for antitrust liability.
but they suggests that one of the few cases in which a legislative petitioner could lose her immunity is
when she makes knowingly false statements in her petitions. See AREEDA AND HOVENKAMP, stuf)fr
note 8 1,at 177.
241. See McGowan and Lemley, stpra note 68, at 384-85. "Because of the nature and purpose of
these fora, the First Amendment should not impair the ability of courts and agencies to enforce their
own rules, including rules designed to punish claimants who bring worthless claims and abuse the
relevant judicial processes." li. at 389.
242. See Professional Real Estate Investors. Inc. v.Columbia Pictures Indus.. 508 U.S. 49,65 (1993).
243. See id. at 67 (Souter, J.. concurring).
244. See, e.g., United States v. Wagner, 940 F. Supp. 972, 974-982 (1996) (finding such bias
motivated defendants to violate the Act).
245. See Seng, supra note 189, at 410. See 461 U.S. at 748-49.
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to fight school segregation in Virginia, litigation is a powerful weapon in the fight
for civil rights. This dual character of litigation makes it difficult to determine
when a lawsuit should lose its First Amendment immunity, it also suggests that we
should be wary of attempts to limit the right to petition the courts based on the
perceived intent of that litigation.
In adopting a framework for addressing lawsuits which may violate the Fair
Housing Act, the Supreme Court's recognition in Bill Johnson's that state court
lawsuits that violate federal law are not protected by the right to petition should
guide the courts.246 Applying the illegal objective exception to cases involving
zoning, restrictive covenants, or other lawsuits that clearly violate the Act ensures
that Congress' goal to provide fair housing throughout the nation is upheld. Courts
may assess other lawsuits under Bill Johnson'stwo-part test to impose liability on
those who would file frivolous lawsuits for improper reasons. This standard
protects the lawful exercise of the right to petition and provides a proper measure
of deference to legitimate state concerns without abandoning our national
commitment to fair housing.

246.

See Bill Johnson's. 461 U.S. at 748-49.

